

**MISSIONARY MAGAZINE;**

**OR**

**EVANGELICAL INTELLIGENCER.**

THE

GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S

MISSIONARY MAGAZINE;

OR

EVANGELICAL INTELLIGENCER:

FOR 1805.

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WILLIAM P. FARRAND, EDITOR.

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VOL. I.

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PHILADELPHIA:

PRINTED FOR, AND PUBLISHED BY, WILLIAM P. FARRAND AND CO.  
N<sup>o</sup> 170, MARKET STREET.

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1806.

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## ASSEMBLY'S MISSIONARY MAGAZINE;

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## EVANGELICAL INTELLIGENCER.

VOL. I.

APRIL, 1805.

NO. IV.

## MODERN MISSIONARY SOCIETIES.—CONTINUED.

## THE CONNECTICUT MISSIONARY SOCIETY.

The Missionary Society of Connecticut was instituted in 1798; and, since that period, has uniformly and successfully pursued the objects for which it was formed. Its attention has been principally directed to the promulgation of the gospel, and the establishment of churches, in the new settlements in the northern part of Vermont, in the north and west parts of the State of New-York, and in the northwestern parts of Pennsylvania. Very considerable attempts to instruct and christianize the savages have been made, and the friends of the undertaking have much cause to rejoice for past success, and to be encouraged to future exertions. Wherever Missionaries from this society have gone, they have met with very favourable reception; great attention has been given to their preaching: and the hearers have generally expressed great obligations to their brethren in Connecticut for the pains which they take for their salvation. In many parts, schools and churches have been established, the children have been instructed and baptized, the Lord's Supper administered, and the Missionaries have much cause to hope that, by the blessing of God upon their labours, *many souls ready to perish have been brought to a saving knowledge of divine truth.*

## ON THE INTERNAL EVIDENCE OF THE CHRISTIAN SCRIPTURES.

The works of God are all worthy of himself. They contain in them sufficient internal marks of divine origin. Those of nature impress the mind of the rudest savage with the idea of the agency of a superior hand, and to the cultured and most comprehensive mind, the wonders of creation afford ever new and more convincing proofs of the power and wisdom of God. But *his word* he hath magnified above all his name. In his word, therefore, we may justly expect to discover such an impression of his perfections, particularly of his wisdom, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth, as may fully convince us that it proceeds from God. It may indeed be said, that if the scriptures contain in themselves such self-evidencing light and power, they must flash conviction of their truth on all who read them. Such conviction they doubtless would flash on the minds of all men, were not their mental powers so deplorably corrupted. Under the influence of this corruption they are disposed to shut their eyes, lest the light of the glorious gospel of Christ, who is the image of the invisible God, should shine unto them. Hence that declaration of our Saviour, John, vii. 17, ‘If any man *will do his will*, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God.’ It is the want of disposition to do the will of God, that prevents this knowledge. The questions, whether the doctrines of the gospel be of God, and whether they be truth, amount to the same thing. Whatever doctrine is of God, being of the like nature with himself, perfectly consistent with, and truly expressive of him, must be truth; and it must be entirely devoid of every thing that is opposite to truth: that is, it must bear in it the character or impress of divine perfection; it must express the perfection implied, not simply as a property or power, but as a property or power of such excellence, beauty and glory, as is attributable only to God. The doctrines of holy scripture, in short, contain in them an image, or portrait, if I may so speak, of real Divinity: and it is not derived to them by any of those extraneous mediums, to which we sometimes refer in support of their divine origin. The witnesses, who reported the passion and resurrection of the Saviour, made it, no doubt, sufficiently probable to every reasonable, candid and unprejudiced mind, that those were real facts; but, they could not, by their simple report, however circumstantially validated, exhibit the

divine character and glory in those facts imported. This is another thing. It lies in strict propriety of conception, beyond the proper compass of testimony. It springs only, and immediately, from the things testified.

Hence it appears, that in the christian doctrine itself, not an evidence only, but the main evidence of its truth, is to be found; that is, such evidence, as without which, we cannot attain to certainty. All the arguments of the extraneous kind, we have referred to, however important, and, on many accounts, indispensable, are much farther fetched, and will admit of many questions before we can arrive at such light as they are capable of affording. For instance, with respect to testimony, the testimony of men: were the reporters of these things honest men? By what means did they become acquainted with the matters they report? Does it, all things considered, appear, that they really did see those things, of which they affect to be the witnesses? or how are we to be assured, that, with all their seeming confidence, they are not under the power of some deception? Where is their commission? Whence their authority to propagate such doctrines? And, allowing that they wrought miracles, so called, how does it appear, that those works were above the craft and power of any creature? With respect to prophecy also, it must be observed, that the prophecies were spoken, and the accomplishment of the events referred to, were reported by men. The authority and the credibility of the prophets must, therefore, be inquired into, as well as those of the New Testament witnesses. Besides, how does it appear, that the events recorded, were those very events to which the prophecies refer? And, if it be said, that they did refer to those very events, still the questions will recur, were they not men who report the actual occurrence of those events? Upon what ground stands their credibility? And all these questions must be solved, ere we can arrive at the truth; and when we have arrived, though we may have compassed the truth, it is not, with respect to our perception, certain truth: it is but probability, though probability, perhaps, of a high degree. But it is otherwise with the evidence arising from the doctrines themselves. These, as has been said, express the distinguishing excellence, beauty, and glory of God. From this perception to that of the truth of the doctrine, there is but one step. The argument is, at once, direct and concise as pos-

sible, and between the simple knowledge of it and the conclusion, there is not room for a single question.

It must, indeed, be allowed, that this argument, superior and decisive as it is, can serve but to little purpose with those, who are devoid of that peculiar discernment or moral, say rather spiritual, perception, which is needful to the knowledge of it. No man can be effectually convinced of the truth of the christian doctrine from the glory and divinity of it, unless he has the real perception of its divinity and glory. When this is once ascertained, he has the conviction at once. The argument is but one: that is, the doctrine is true; for it hath divine excellence in it.

It need not be thought strange, if objections should arise in the minds of some, concerning this species of evidence. These objections arise and operate only with those whose minds are destitute of that peculiar aptitude, or spiritual taste, which is always presupposed in the just discernment of spiritual things. Those whose minds, by the grace of heaven, are thus informed, cannot fail of discovering the spiritual import of the doctrine; and those, who have the discovery, must needs have along with it a conviction of the certain truth of the doctrine. Between the glorious object discerned in the doctrine, and all other objects, they perceive a difference, so marked, and so essential, that they can no longer doubt, whether the doctrine be divine or not: And, for those who are devoid of the predisposing taste or aptitude mentioned, it would be highly absurd in them not to allow this in respect to the Divine Being and our knowledge of him, when they daily allow what amounts to the same in respect to many other things; and things, which are very complex in their natures and compounded in their parts. Is there not something in the Sun essentially different from all other objects which strike our eye? And, when we behold it, are we not at once very rationally satisfied, that it is the Sun and nothing else? When we read a poetical work, we perceive in it at once, that which distinguishes it from every other work of human genius; we perceive in it, that in which poetry consisteth. And, by the way, it is not unusual in men of taste and discernment in the arts of imitation, to descry in them beauties, which they neither can point out to others, nor convince others that they see, unless they can take their word for it. If then, I say, we can thus with rational certainty conclude concerning other objects, why not much rather concerning those which are in the strictest sense divine?

All other objects are, in some respects, of a mixed nature. God is, in the most perfect sense, simple and one. His nature, his excellences, his glory, are therefore, when discovered, more distinguishable than any thing else. He cannot, indeed, be seen at all as he is, unless that be seen, in which pure and specific divinity consists. Now, from this results to the mind, perceiving him in the christian doctrine, a decided conviction of its truth; although the person, thus convinced, may not be able to give any other reason for it than this: viz—that there is divinity in it; a transcendent excellence, beauty, majesty, and glory, which belongeth only to God.

So the disciples were assured, that their master, Jesus, was the son of God; for, in his character, his words, and his works, ‘they beheld his glory; the glory of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.’ They had a discovery of his glory, in its proper distinct nature, as divine; and that glory was, a perfection in grace and truth; grace and truth in that form and measure, which is proper to deity only. Hence they saw clearly, and with full assurance, the truth of that doctrine; and with confidence reported, that *he*, the word, was God.

Thus the scriptures, solely from the signature of divinity, or, in other words, from the authority of God manifest in them, demand our attention, faith, and obedience. That faith in their divine inspiration or truth, which is built only or chiefly on the performance of miracles, or the accomplishment of prophecies, or on any other foundation than the authority of God, discovering itself in the word, though good and requisite in a certain degree, yet cannot be altogether answerable, either in point of becoming respect, or of its practical influence, to the testimony of the God of truth. That faith, in short, in the divine authority of the scriptures, which is unto salvation, the faith of every genuine disciple of Jesus, is founded chiefly in their perception, say heart-felt perception, of the word, as the power of God, and the wisdom of God.

The subject of these observations is important; and, as I conceive, intimately connected with the propagation of the glorious gospel, the great object of the Missionary Society. If the faith of missionaries in the inspiration of the Scriptures, as saith a sensible writer of Great Britain, depends entirely on the performance of miracles, or the accomplishment of prophecy, their main point, especially in endeavouring to convert the heathen, must be, to prove, that supernatural

events have confirmed the truth of christianity, and that the predictions connected with them have been fulfilled. But, if the faith of the missionary rests on the signatures of the divine perfections appearing in the word itself, he will be chiefly concerned to display to the ignorant the pure and simple doctrines of the cross.

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### THE CELEBRATED OBJECTION OF MR. HUME TO THE MIRACLES OF THE GOSPEL.

When the defenders of christianity thought they had established the evidences of the miraculous history of our Saviour upon foundations which could no longer be shaken, the ingenious Mr. Hume invented an argument which revived the spirits of vanquished infidelity, and has since been triumphantly urged by all the enemies of religion, as irrefragable, and decisive against every proof that can possibly be alledged in favour of divine revelation. His celebrated argument is this,—That miracles are, in their own nature, incredible, and that, therefore, no testimony can ever verify them. The only rational foundation of our belief of what has ever happened, or what can happen in the world is our own *experience* of what does constantly take place in the course of nature. Men may be false, or may be deceived, but nature never changes. As we, then, have had no experience of any miraculous changes in the order of the world, it is unreasonable to believe that any have ever existed, whatever may be the number, or the character of the men by whom they are attested.—This reasoning was esteemed, by those who were inclined to reject divine revelation, to be unanswerable, and, for a moment, it seemed to its friends to be the most formidable attack which had yet been made on the authenticity of the sacred scriptures. It has since, however, been vigorously repelled, and I think effectually overthrown by many pious and excellent writers, and by none with more skill and force than by Bishop Watson in his letter on this subject to Mr. Gibbon.

But, it appears to me that Mr. Hume's redoubted argument may be destroyed by a process more simple and obvious than most of those which have hitherto been employed against it. And a plain, concise, and popular refutation of such



an adversary, whose writings are in the hands of almost all young persons, may answer some of the valuable ends contemplated by your Magazine.

On Mr. Hume's principle, that no miracle is credible because it is contrary to our experience of the uniformity of the course of nature, it would be impossible for God to make any revelation of his will to the world, distinct from the structure of the world itself, whatever reasons for it might exist in the state of human nature. Such a revelation would itself be a miracle, whether made to mankind immediately by a voice from heaven, or by the more humble instrumentality of prophets and apostles. And, if by the agency of the latter, their divine mission could be authenticated only by such works of omnipotence as would be a sufficient demonstration to the world that the spirit of God accompanied and instructed them. This is a consequence of the principle, I am aware, not at all alarming to those by whom it is urged, but rather a subject of their triumph. But, I trust, there are few reasonable and serious men who are willing to say that it is impossible for God to make any extraordinary communication of his will to his erring and miserable creatures.

But, I add, that this principle leads to Atheism—acted upon to its full extent it would resist all improvements in science,—it refutes itself.

It leads to Atheism. For if our own experience of the uniformity of nature is the sole test of a reasonable belief concerning whatever has been, or what ever shall be, in the history of the world, it is impossible that the world should ever have had a beginning, it is impossible that it should ever have an end. It must have existed, it must continue to exist, eternally in the same order in which we now behold it. There can be no future state of existence, no future judgment, no future retribution to the virtuous and the wicked; for these are all contrary to our experience; there can be, therefore, no foundation for religion. The world, eternal in its own nature, must exist independent on any intelligent and omnipotent cause. But the only proof of the being of God is derived from the wise order and harmony of the world; and if this is order eternal and uncreated, it would at least be unphilosophical to suppose the existence of a Deity who would then be a superfluous and unnecessary appendage to the universe. We must receive the absurd idea of an eternal succession of mutable and perishing beings governed only by their own internal and immutable laws. We must believe, that there is no God, or

embrace the old Aristotelian hypothesis, which is but one step removed from Atheism, that the universe itself is God.

These consequences flow so obviously from the principle, that I have been surprised not to find them urged with more point and force than they have been by the friends and defenders of christianity. Indeed, I have scarcely seen them touched except transiently by the judicious and ingenious Dr. Allen\*. They are consequences, however, which, though not displeasing to a part of the followers of Mr. Hume, yet, I trust, were never contemplated by the greater portion of them. Atheism has not yet become so fashionable in Great Britain. And if they are, as I believe, the genuine results of the principles, they must be decisive against it in the opinion of every pious and virtuous man.

Another consequence of this principle, though not so gross and impious as the former, tends not less to demonstrate its absurdity ;—it would, if acted upon to its full extent, arrest all improvements in science. Permit me, by a familiar example to illustrate and confirm this proposition. When first the effects of the electric or magnetic influence were discovered, how ought all philosophers, on this ground, if, on this ground a philosopher could have ever existed, to have treated the history of them ? precisely as infidels have treated the history of the gospel, rejected them instantly, and without examination, as absurd and impossible, because contrary to all their *experience*. Do you say let them repeat the same experiments by which these new powers in nature were originally discovered ? But, if the principle which we are combating be certain and infallible, a wise man could have no motive for making the experiment, since his own past experience of the course of nature is the criterion of whatever is possible, or credible. Even if he should repeat the experiment, I do not know whether he could consistently admit the testimony of his senses to a new fact ; certainly not the testimony of other persons. And what are

\* *A celebrated French Refugee in England, in his reflections on the books of the sacred scriptures.*

*This work was published in London, 1688 ; and shews that the objection of Mr. Hume to the evidences of christianity, is not novel, but has only been set in a new and stronger light by that ingenious writer.*

the greater portion of mankind to do, who have neither the skill nor the means of experimenting?

Let us take another example where no counter experience can possibly be applied. The inhabitants of a torrid climate never can have the effects of frost made obvious to their senses. Congelation is as great a mystery to them as any mystery, or miracle of the christian religion. According to this favourite maxim of infidelity, then, they ought never to believe it, and the king of Siam acted right in punishing the Dutch navigator for attempting to insult his understanding by incredible stories, who assured him that in Holland, during part of the year, water became sufficiently hard to bear men, and carriages drawn by horses, upon its surface. If testimony, then, were under no circumstances, sufficient to vouch to us, facts which not only are not conformable, but which, in many instances, are wholly contrary to all our past experience, science must be arrested in the very commencement of its progress. This consequence was, certainly, not adverted to by the ingenious writer who invented, or gave its present form, to the principle against which we contend. But, when we are testing the merit of a principle, if it is not found to hold universally, or co-extensively with the latitude of its terms, it ought to be rejected. For, by what rule shall we apply it only to the facts of religion, when it is found absolutely false in its application to the facts of science?

I maintain, in the last place, that this celebrated argument, drawn from our experience of the uniformity of nature, refutes itself. For, if the physical course of nature, on which the argument rests, is found to be stable and uniform, the moral order of things appears to be not less steady and invariable. If the former of these facts, upon Mr. Hume's principle, stands in the way of the admission of any miraculous history, the latter, upon the same ground, forbids the rejection of the history, if, by rejecting it, we must contradict all themoral phenomena of human nature. Admitting, then, what can hardly be denied by the bitterest enemies of religion, that the apostles and evangelists were men of the soundest understanding,\* and the most upright hearts, it is contrary to all

\* *The perfection of the moral system published by these humble fishermen, so far excelling all the philosophy of their age, demonstrates, that either they were inspired from above, to admit which, is yielding the question, or they were men of superior*

that we know of the motives of conduct among mankind, that, for the sake of propagating a most improbable imposture, they should voluntarily submit to incessant toils and extreme sufferings, they should abandon honour, interest, family, all that is usually accounted most dear to the human heart, and march with intrepidity through perpetual persecutions to certain death, inflicted in the most excruciating and dreadful forms. They were evidently not frantic in their writings, which are always rational and simple, and in which there appears to be no tincture of enthusiasm; yet they yielded all their original prejudices, and all their hopes from a triumphant Messiah, to their deep conviction of the divine mission, and the miraculous power of a suffering Master, for whom they encountered every actual evil, and every possible hazard. If, then, we should suppose, with the objectors, that the gospel is not true, here are contradictions to the moral order of things, that is, to all the ordinary principles of conduct among men which have ever occurred to our *experience* in other cases, not less wonderful, and out of the course of nature, than the miracles themselves for which the apostles, and companions of our Lord, and witnesses of his life, made such astonishing and almost incredible sacrifices.\*

This so much vaunted objection, then, against the miracles of the gospel evidently refutes itself, inasmuch as in its application to the established moral order of things it contradicts the conclusion which the enemies of religion have so triumphantly drawn from their physical order. This particular view of the subject merits, and, to give it its full force, would require a more extensive elucidation. But, that I might not encumber your Magazine, I have chosen to represent it with all the conciseness which I thought in any way consistent with perspicuity. It ought to carry with it the greater conviction to the objectors, since they equally subject the natural and the moral world to the laws of necessity, so that the ordinary and natural motives of human conduct must be those also, which are certain and necessary. S.

*minds to the profoundest writers of Greece or Rome. Which is yielding almost as much.*

\* *Some men have encountered great dangers, and endured great sufferings even for an erroneous opinion; but there is a wide difference between dying for an opinion, and in attestation of a fact.*