

A  
R E P L Y

T O

Dr. MAYHEW's Letter of Reproof to Mr.  
JOHN CLEAVELAND of *Ipswich*,

C O N T A I N I N G,

Some observations on said Letter, and a particular consideration of  
the Proof or Evidence exhibited by the Doctor, for the support  
of his *high Objections*.

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By JOHN CLEAVELAND, A. M.,

Pastor of a Church of CHRIST in *Ipswich*.

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PROV. XXVI. 4, 5. NE RESPONDE, CUM RESPONSI  
TUA STULTO TE FECERIT SIMILEM: RESPONDE, CUM  
SILENTIUM TUUM STULTO DEDERIT INSOLESCENDI ANSAM.  
GERERUS IN LOCUM. VER. 4. JUXTA STULTITIAM SUAM,  
ILLIUS IMITANDO STULTITIAM, VOCIFERANDO ET CON  
VITIANDO: VER. 5. JUXTA STULTITIAM SUAM UT  
ILLIUS MERETUR STULTITIA, EUM SOLIDIS RATIONIBUS CON  
VINCENDO, ET GRAVIBUS VERBIS ARGUENDO.

GLOSSÆ MENOCHII.


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B O S T O N, N. E.

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M,DC LXXV.

## E R R A T A.

Page 1, line 12, read *he might*. p. 2, l. 21, r. *into*. p. 4, l. 2 & 3, r. *when so*, and l. 16, r. *spirit*. p. 6, l. 18, r. *opinion*, and l. 27, r. *conception*. p. 8, l. 17, r. *opinion*. p. 9, l. 3, r. *forgiveness?* and l. 6, r. *perfections*. p. 10, l. 15, r. *almost as much*. p. 13, l. 4, r. *is in*. p. 14, l. 2, r. *you?* and l. 18, r. *me?* and l. 21, r. *name?* p. 31, l. 26, r. p. 12. p. 32 l. 6, r. p. 37? p. 34, l. 26, r. *principles?* p. 36, l. 27, r. *chose*. p. 44, l. 4, r. *lose*, and l. 25, r. *spake*. p. 48, l. 19, r. *ment*, and l. 28, r. *understood*. p. 49, l. 2, r. *what*, and l. 7, r. *appeal*, and l. 25 & 26, r. *is it?* p. 53, l. 6, r. *position*, and l. 15, r. *you*. p. 55, l. 17, r. *meaning*, p. 56, l. 23, r. *look*, and l. 25, r. *make*.



A  
R E P L Y  
T O .

Dr. MAYHEW's Letter of reproof, to Mr. JOHN  
CLEVELAND of *Ipswich*.

REVEREND SIR,



SOON after my *Essay* was published, a *Piece* was put into divers of the *BOSTON News-Papers*, containing a large extract from my *Essay*, and divers heavy charges, &c. and particularly, this assertion, *viz.* That it is as much out of character for a gentleman of the doctor's reputation, to enter into a controversy with Mr. Cleaveland, as it would for a general of an army, to accept of a Challenge from a subaltern. As the author's name was not to it, people were left to conjecture as they pleased who it might be: some said it was Dr. *Mayhew*; others said it could not be the doctor; it was too low, too

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ungentle-

ungentlemanlike and scurrilous! A gentleman of the doctor's reputation, would never so act out of character, as to write in such a manner!--But when your letter of reproof, directed to me, came out, with your name to it, both in the title page, and at the close, and they had seen the contents, the stile and the spirit, their objections vanished, and they were left no longer at a loss to conjecture who could write in such a manner, and might with high probability be the author of that *piece*. And as these two *pieces* resemble each other so much, not in *bulk*, but in *stile*, *spirit*, and the *nature* of their *contents*, you will have the honour of being the author of the *former*, notwithstanding it came into publick view like a *foundling*; seeing you have so *folly owned* the *latter*, except you shall publicly *disown* it.

In your letter, P. 4. You "consider me as a person wholly unworthy to be reasoned with," And in p. 20. say, "Indeed it was my determination from the first not to enter upon a dispute, with such a wrong-headed and worse-hearted wretch." I suppose you thought it out of character for a gentleman of your reputation to do it. But pray Sir what were Israel but wrong-headed and worse-hearted wretches? They rebelled against the LORD, did not consider, ah sinful nation! (saith the LORD) a people laden with iniquity,

*ay,---a seed of evil doers,---children that are corrup-*  
*ters,---they have forsaken the LORD,---they have*  
*provoked the Holy One of Israel to anger.---They are*  
*gone away backward, they will revolt more and more.*  
*the whole head is sick, and the whole heart faint.--*  
*from the sole of the foot even unto the head, there is no*  
*soundness in it; but wounds, and bruises, and putrifying*  
*sores,---and are called Sodom, and the people of*  
*Gomorrab.---Their hands were full of blood. In short,*  
 they are represented to be almost (if not altogether)  
 as bad as you represent me to be in your letter;  
 and yet, be astonished O heavens! tremble O earth!  
 and thou O doctor! JEHOVAH, *the high and lofty*  
*one, who inhabits ETERNITY,* compared with whom,  
 the whole creation is nothing,---less than nothing,  
 and vanity,---said, *even to such wrong-headed and*  
*worse-hearted wretches,* COME NOW AND LET US REA-  
 SON TOGETHER! and he drew them with *cords of a*  
*man,* and with *bands of love:* not with such *cords* and  
*bands* as beasts are drawn with; but such as were  
 suited to the reasonable nature of man; shewing by  
 clear demonstrations, that his own ways were equal,  
 and calling upon his creatures to hear the LORD's  
 controversy: thus hath the LORD treated men! and  
 shall a poor nothing worm of the dust say to his  
 fellow worm, that he considers him as wholly un-  
 worthy to be reasoned with? or shall he, or any  
 worm for him say, that it is out of character for

one of his reputation, to enter into a dispute with such a *wrong-headed* and *worse-hearted wretch*; when an absolute Being has not thought it out of character for him, to say to such wretches, *come now and let us reason together*? Query, What must Dr. Maybaw's character and reputation be, if it is out of character for one of his reputation, to treat such men as reasonable creatures, whom the God of heaven and earth, does not think it out of character for him, to treat as reasonable creatures?

In p. 7, you speak of yourself as being, at least, by your station and profession, *a minister of the Gospel*. And in p. 47, and 48, you, in effect, acknowledge me to be one, by station and profession, as appears from the nature of several of your articles of advice: but what manner of spirits ought such to be of, to maintain their just character, that the ministry be not blamed? ought we not to be *humble, meek, and gentle, examples* of the believers in word, in conversation, in charity, in spirit, in faith, in purity? when there was a strife among Christ's disciples, which of them should be accounted the greatest, Christ our Lord said unto them, *the king's of the gentiles exercise lordship over them, but ye shall not be so; If any man desire to be first, the same shall be last of all, and servant of all*: what shall we say to this doctor? must that minister, that desires to be accounted as

much

much above his fellow ministers, as a *general of an army* is above a *subaltern*, be esteemed the last of all, to be no more than a *subaltern*? would you not conclude so, from this text, as a *protestant against the papa's supremacy*, and, as a *dissenter, against the episcopalian prelacy*? how then, is it as much out of character for Dr. *Mayhew*, a dissenting minister of the gospel, to enter into a controversy with Mr. *Cleveland*, who is also a dissenting minister of the gospel, as for a *general of an army*, to accept of a challenge from a *subaltern*? In dignity of office, I am not a whit behind the chiefest of the dissenting ministers, tho' in knowledge and grace, I freely own, I am but a child. A lofty proud spirit, does not belong to the character of a gospel minister; therefore, if we had more humility, we should act more in the character of a gospel minister; let us then learn of Christ, who was meek and lowly in heart; yea, let the same mind be in us, which was in Christ Jesus. And let me freely ask you, whether, you think it probable, that you should have gone into such a way and manner of writing, as in your letter, if you had been under the prevailing influence of gospel humility, and considered yourself as a disciple of the meek Jesus, and a minister of that gospel, which breathes such a sweet spirit?

You frequently call my *essay* a *libel*, and as frequently charge me, in effect, with lying; but what  
would

would you have charged me with, if I had represented you to the world, as being almost ignorant of letters, as you represent me in p. 4, "one so unletter'd" say you! and as not being capable of construing common *Latin*, any more than common English readers, as you suggest in p. 8; for having inserted a Latin passage from Dr. *Twisse*, you say, "which for the sake of you Mr. Cleaveland, and my other English readers, I here translate." Some, perhaps, may say, art thou not inexcusable, O Doctor, that judgest another, &c.

You, also in p. 4, speaking of what I say of our able divines, their not attempting to vindicate the truth against you, strangely infer their silence to be a proof, that none of them "thought there was any occasion for opposition to you," and hence that I set up my "little self in opposition to their opinions, as well as to your sermons." But how could you do so, seeing you own that "many wise and excellent men" have different conceptions from you about divine justice, and the atonement of Christ? see sermon, p. 65, and letter, p. 34. And also, seeing you assert, that "these different conceptions of the matter, are respectively followed by consequences of a very important nature." See sermon, p. 20. How could they see their conceptions of divine justice, and the atone-  
ment



ment of Christ opposed by you, which you allow is followed by *consequences of a very important nature*; and yet, not think, there was any occasion for opposition to you? To be sure, wise and excellent men must see there is occasion for opposition to you, when you openly set yourself up in opposition to such conceptions of theirs, as are followed by consequences of a very important nature; and therefore I did not set up my little self, in opposition to their opinion in that respect: you must conclude the cause of their silence to be something else. I did not pretend to say what it was; but, perhaps, they might think, that bul-ragging scurility and throwing of dirt, were more agreeable to you than rational argumentation; and therefore, the attempt to reclaim you would likely prove fruitless: I can't say how it was, but now they have a specimen of your rare talent; it beats all of the kind I ever saw or heard of before.

You do, indeed, intimate in p. 37, that I have endeavoured to represent you to the world, as *an impious fool and madman*: to which I shall only say if that is the light, in which you now stand to the very life, in the view of the world; I will leave it to the world, to determine who has done the most, to set you in that light before their eyes, you, or I.

In your letter p. 7, and 8, speaking in reference to Dr. *Twisse's* opinion, of the non-necessity of atonement, in order to forgiveness of sin, you say, "and his opinion ought, perhaps, to have almost as much weight as that of Mr. *Cleaveland* of *Ipswich*." But I say, not only almost, but altogether as much weight, provided the arguments for the support of his, are just as weighty, as the arguments for the support of mine: I produced arguments for the support of mine, from what I esteemed foundation principles; had you acted in character, instead of doing what you have done, you would have considered those foundation-principles, and the arguments from them as you was desired. Now, if my opinion is grounded on foundation-principles, neither Dr. *Twisse's*, nor Dr. *Mayhew's*, nor any other doctor's opinions opposite to it, can have any weight with men of sound reason, untill these foundation-principles, or the arguments from them, for the support of my opinion, of the absolute necessity of atonement in order to forgiveness, are removed: but as you have not considered these principles, nor attempted to shew my arguments from them to be inconclusive, how can you say that Dr. *Twisse's* opinion of the non-necessity of atonement ought, perhaps, to have almost as much weight as that of Mr. *Cleaveland* of *Ipswich*, especially, seeing you say in p. 9, "that the manner in which

“ which you expressed yourself (in your sermons)  
 “ upon this point, rather implied a *moral necessity*  
 “ thereof in order to forgiveness.” For if you  
 hold to a moral necessity of atonement in order to  
 forgiveness, that is, a necessity arising from the  
 moral perfection of God, his moral law and gover-  
 nment, you and I are agreed in our opinion of the  
 necessity of atonement,--and Dr. *Twisse's* opinion  
 is just as opposite to Dr. *Mayhew's*, as it is to Mr.  
*Cleveland's*; and therefore you might have said,  
 “ altho' the manner in which I expressed myself up-  
 “ on the point of *atonement*, implied a moral neces-  
 “ sity thereof, in order to forgiveness; yet, Dr.  
 “ *Twisse's* opinion of the non-necessity, ought, per-  
 “ haps, to have almost as much weight, as that  
 “ of Dr. *Mayhew of Boston.*” But if the manner in  
 which you expressed yourself, implied a moral ne-  
 cessity of atonement, you either expressed your own  
 opinion, or you did not :--If you did not express  
 your own opinion, then you said one thing and  
 meant the reverse; or you did not intend that  
 meaning, which you now say your expressions im-  
 plied :--but if you expressed your own opinion, and  
 yet think the opposite opinion ought to have almost  
 as much weight; than it will follow, that what  
 turns the scale (with you) in favour of a moral ne-  
 cessity of atonement, is of but little weight; a little  
 weight turns the scale, when one end of it is almost

as weighty as the other: this corresponds with a passage in my paraphrase upon some passages in your sermons, viz. "The eternal rule of right, and the honor and dignity of God's moral law and government, are of so small weight, that they did but just turn the scale in favour of an atonement to be made for sin, by the sacrifice of Christ." See *Essay*, p. 76.

But if you intend to prefer Dr. Twisse's opinion to mine, by saying, "it ought, perhaps, to have as much weight, &c." which, if you speak ironically, signifies, that it ought to have much more weight; then it will follow, that tho' the manner in which you expressed yourself, implied a moral necessity of atonement, yet, you think the opinion of non-necessity of it, ought to have much more weight, or to be preferred greatly to the other: and in this case, all your expressions in your sermons, implying a moral necessity, must be set aside, as having no weight in them worthy of notice; or whatever weight they have, is not for, but against you, and will only serve to sink you the deeper into the mire.

Your design in introducing Dr. Twisse's opinion is obvious. Your argument from it, is to this effect, viz. "If Dr. Twisse, an eminent Calvinistic di-  
vine,

“ vine, prolocutor of, and in high repute with the  
 “ Westminster assembly of divines, for which you  
 “ express so great a veneration, was full and posi-  
 “ tive in his opinion, that sin might be forgiven  
 “ without any satisfaction, and particularly, that  
 “ the justice of God did not indispensibly require  
 “ it; it did not become you, even you Mr. Cleave-  
 “ land, to inveigh against me, as an enemy to some  
 “ of the most important principles of the prote-  
 “ stant reformed system of Christianity; more e-  
 “ specially, as an enemy to the doctrine of Christ’s  
 “ sacrifice and atonement, as being absolutely ne-  
 “ cessary to the pardon of sin, consistently with  
 “ God’s infinite and unchangeable rectitude, even  
 “ upon supposition, that I had as expressly assert-  
 “ ed the non-necessity of atonement; how much  
 “ less did it become you, when I was so far from  
 “ asserting it, that the manner in which I express-  
 “ ed myself upon this point, rather implied a mo-  
 “ ral necessity thereof, in order to forgiveness.”

This I take to be the purport of your arguing.  
 Before I answer, I must premise a few things, viz.  
 1, That the Westminster assembly, were an assem-  
 bly of Calvinistic divines. 2, That the confession  
 of faith and catechisms, drawn up by these divines,  
 may properly be termed the protestant reformed  
 system of Christianity. 3, That the moral necessity  
 of atonement in order to forgiveness, is an essenti-

al and fundamental principle in that system; therefore, 4, That if Dr. *Twisse* asserted the non-necessity of atonement, (as you say he did) he denied an essential and fundamental principle in the protestant reformed system of Christianity. These things cannot be denied,

Now, the first part of your argument turns upon this inquiry, viz. Whether it would have become any one of that venerable assembly, or any other Calvinistic divine, who held the moral necessity of Christ's atonement in order to forgiveness, to demonstrate and vindicate the same against Dr. *Twisse*, and to shew how inconsistent his opinion is, not only with the Calvinistic system, but also with many of his own assertions; and how it necessarily aspersed the doctrine of Christ's atonement, as being absolutely necessary to the pardon of sin, consistently with God's infinite and unchangeable rectitude? For if it would become any one to defend, what he judged an essential and most important principle of Christianity, against Dr. *Twisse*, it might, most certainly, against Dr. *Mayhew*; but if it would not become any one against Dr. *Twisse*, and for the same reason, it did not become me against Dr. *Mayhew*, it must be either, 1, because Dr. *Twisse* was prolocutor or chairman to the Westminster assembly of Calvinistic divines, and in high  
repute

repute with them: but then the argument fails, except it be made to appear, that Dr. *Mayhew* has been prolocutor or chairman to an assembly of Calvinistic divines, and in high repute with them. Or, 2, Because Dr. *Twisse* was an eminent Calvinistic divine; but here the argument fails, except it appears, that Dr. *Mayhew* is an eminent Calvinistic divine. Or, 3, because Dr. *Twisse* was doctor of divinity: now, perhaps, I have hit the right nail on the head; if so, must it not follow, that it does not become any minister, who is not a doctor of divinity, to attempt a defence of any of the most important doctrines of Christianity, against a doctor of divinity? but why so? is it because it is as much out of character for a doctor of divinity, to enter into a controversy with a minister that is not a doctor of divinity, as it is for a general of an army, to accept of a challenge from a subaltern? But 4, if neither of the above-mentioned is the reason, what can it be, if it is not this, viz. because it is not becoming any minister, to make an attempt to defend, what are esteemed essential and most important principles of Christianity, against any writer whatsoever, let his assertions be never so opposite, or repugnant to such essential and most important principles: and therefore, upon supposition, you had expressly asserted the non-necessity of atonement, it did not become me (or any one else

else) to attempt to demonstrate the contrary opinion against you. Some hints in your letter, give grounds to suspect, that I have at last hit on the very thing itself. In p. 48, you say to me,
   
 “ preach your own sentiments honestly; but you
   
 “ should not represent *all those* who dislike them,
   
 “ as enemies to the most important doctrines of
   
 “ Christianity. Christians should exercise forbear-
   
 “ ance and candor towards each other; and Chris-
   
 “ tian ministers (of whom it seems, you reckon
   
 “ yourself one) ought to set the example.” And
   
 in p. 39, you say, “ Had I not a right to speak
   
 “ my sentiments upon these points? if you dislik-
   
 “ ed them, could you not content yourself with
   
 “ preaching your own? or, if you must needs pub-
   
 “ lish them, would it not have been more *decent*
  
 “ and *expedient* for you to do it, without engaging
   
 “ in a personal controversy *with me*, would not any
   
 “ end, which you could propose to yourself, have
   
 “ been answered as well, *tho’ you had never menti-*
  
 “ *oned my name!*” I understand you well doctor;
   
 Gentlemen of loose and unsound principles would
   
 be glad, especially, if they have wrote what they
   
 are not capable of defending by clear reasoning, to
   
 have it established, and so esteemed by all, as a *ve-*
  
*ry indecent and unbecoming thing, for any person to de-*
  
 *fend the truth against them, and point out their incon-*
  
 *sistencies: and by shewing a liking to such a thing,*
  
 they



they bewray to the world, that they don't esteem any principles of Christianity to be of very great importance, and which ought *earnestly to be contended for*. But, Sir, I believe there are some very essential, and most important doctrines in Christianity: and as you advise me to *preach my own sentiments honestly*, however contrary they are to yours, you, in effect, advise me to preach what I esteem most important doctrines of Christianity; but I must not represent *all those, who dislike them*, as enemies to the most important doctrines of Christianity; even altho' I do myself esteem the doctrines they dislike to be most important. *Query*, Whether a person ought not to be esteemed an enemy to those doctrines he dislikes? again, whether, if I must not represent *all those* who dislike most important doctrines, as enemies to them, I may some of them; and if I may some of them, whether such in particular, as have publickly shewed their dislike to some such doctrines? but you Sir, speaking of the doctrine of the imputation of *Adam's* first sin to infants, a doctrine asserted by the Westminster assembly, some of whose words on that head you have marked with double comma's, take the liberty, to call such doctrine, *the grossest of all absurdities*, and to say, "they who are capable of believing such doctrine, are to be pitied, as persons of a sadly depraved judgment." See sermon, p. 62, 63. It seems,  
it

it is not at all *indecent for you*, to declaim against some of the principles of that venerable assembly, and against their persons too, but it is *very indecent for me*, to vindicate some of those principles *against you*; except I do it in such a manner, that nobody shall know who the enemy is, that I fight against.\*

But to come to the last part of your argument, viz. “ that you were so far from asserting the non-  
 “ necessity of atonement, that the manner in  
 “ which you expressed yourself upon this point,  
 “ rather implied a moral necessity thereof, &c.  
 “ and therefore it did not become me to inveigh  
 “ against you, &c.” To which I shall say, 1, that I grant you do sometimes express yourself in such a manner, but it is only when you are speaking upon principles, belonging to the Calvinistic system of Christianity: if you had steered wholly clear of all the principles of this system, you never would have expressed yourself in such a manner, as to imply a moral necessity of atonement, in order to forgiveness: but, 2, you express yourself sometimes in such a manner, as necessarily implies a non-necessity

\* *Indians*. while they ly hid in the bushes, will take aim, and shoot directly at their enemy; but if they are discovered and exposed to open view, *they are in the terrors of the shadow of death*; and I don't know but it is so with such men, of a less dark complexion, who were born amongst, and brought up with them.

cessity of atonement; and then you are speaking upon your own principles; at least, upon principles set up in opposition to some of the leading principles of the Calvinistic system; and are leading and fundamental principles of a contrary scheme: hence, if this was the case, there was occasion for opposition to you, tho' you did sometimes express yourself, in such a manner as implied a moral necessity of atonement.

If a writer sometimes advances principles belonging to one system, and anon, principles belonging to another, and a quite contrary scheme; and these contrary principles, are interspersed and intermingled in the same discourse, he will necessarily run into a multiplicity of inconsistencies: and in such a case, we are to attend to the author's principles, which he labours to establish; and if these necessarily imply a non-necessity of atonement, we must conclude, either, that he has never digested these principles; or else, that he is, an enemy to the moral necessity of atonement, in order to forgiveness; and if he is an enemy to it, what does it avail, for him to say, he expressed himself in such a manner, as rather implied such a necessity?

Now, you can't deny, that you asserted, " there  
 ' is no medium betwixt (God's) being actually kind  
 C " and

“ and merciful to all, and his being positively cruel  
 “ and unmerciful to some.” See sermon, p. 35.  
 And that punitive justice is only a branch or mode  
 of goodness. P. 20. That “ by goodness is pri-  
 “ marily intended, the *kindness, benevolence, and*  
 “ *bounty of his nature.*” P. 10. That punitive  
 justice is not really distinct from kindness:---that  
 “ there is no such quality as justice, really distinct  
 “ from goodness; not even in punishing; for it is  
 “ *goodness itself that gives the blow.*” P. 21. “ So  
 “ that even in this case of excision, or capital pu-  
 “ nishment, the justice of the sovereign is no real  
 “ *quality in him, distinct from goodness.*” P. 22.  
 “ *Justice even in punishing, is only another name for*  
 “ *goodness in one particular view, or under a cer-*  
 “ *tain modification of it.*” P. 23. And as to God’s  
 end, you say, “ such a being must know what is  
 “ *in itself good, as an end, viz. happiness;*” which  
 he pursues in doing good. P. 45. And it is quite  
 evident, in p. 77, that you prefer such expressi-  
 ons concerning the supreme Being, as represent  
 him to be such an infinitely good one, who aims at  
 making his creatures happy, without any selfish end;  
 rather than to say, “ That God’s view is to pro-  
 mote his own glory by doing good, making the latter  
 the means, and the former the end.” And to the  
 same import, is something you say in p. 25 and 26,  
 viz. “ To say that the infinitely wise and good  
 “ God

“ God, punishes any of his creatures merely for his  
 “ own glory, without any regard to the preserva-  
 “ tion of order and happiness, and even contrary  
 “ to the common good of those, to whom he was  
 “ pleased to give being, appears to me at best ve-  
 “ ry irrational.” Here you intimate, that some  
 may hold, that God punishes some of his creatures,  
*merely for his own glory, without any regard to the*  
 preservation of order, happiness, &c. As you are  
 speaking of God’s end in punishing, you must in-  
 tend his supreme and ultimate end, and this is either  
*merely his own glory, or else, the preservation of order,*  
*happiness, and the common good of his creatures, : we*  
 assert that it is *merely his own glory*, and that the  
*preservation* of order and happiness, and common  
 good, is only a *means* to this end: but if this ap-  
 pears to you at best very irrational, then you must  
 maintain, that the preservation of order, happiness,  
 &c. is his supreme and ultimate end which he aims  
 at, without any regard to his own glory; or that  
 he aims at making his creatures happy, *merely with-*  
*out any selfish end.* And from these and such like  
 passages in your sermons, I take the following to  
 be your principles, viz.

That the good and happiness of the creatures, is  
 the end, truly great, noble and excellent, which the  
 infinitely good God has in view and aims at.

That, as there is no medium betwixt actual kindness and positive cruelty; and as it is impious to the last degree to suppose any cruelty in God, God must be all kindness in all his perfections, and must be actually kind and merciful to all his creatures; otherwise he would be positively cruel and unmerciful to some of them.

That punitive justice in God, is only a branch or mode of his goodness, a *quality not really distinct from kindness and benevolence.*

These are not principles in the common protestant system, but are leading and fundamental principles of a scheme directly opposite to it. And you do, in effect acknowledge this, in sermon p. 20, where, speaking of your conception of divine justice, *as only a branch or mode of goodness, and of the contrary conception of it, as an attribute distinct from goodness, which is the conception that many wise and excellent men have of it, you say, " these*  
 | *" different conceptions of the matter, tho' they may*  
*" at first appear immaterial, are respectively follow-*  
*" ed by CONSEQUENCES OF A VERY IMPORTANT NA-*  
*" TURE."*

Let us take a view of *some* of the very important consequences, which follow from your principles.

If God's *end* and *design* in the creation and government, which he aims at, is the good and happiness of the creatures, it will follow, if God's end can't be frustrated or defeated; or if, he is omnipotent and independant, and therefore can't meet with any difficulty to obstruct his pursuing his end, that the creatures will all finally be happy. Also it will follow, that God "has no right to command his creatures, but only so far as he annexes rewards to obedience, and makes it their interest to obey. That the only rule of right, or the "sole critericon of moral good and evil, truth and falshood, right and wrong, duty and sin," is "the natural tendency which things have to promote our own happiness," or the happiness of the creatures; and as God being all knowing, must know the natural tendency, which things have to promote the happiness of his creatures, so he must know what *means* and *ways* of doing it, are the *best*, the *propereft*, and *most effectual*; so as to be subject to no mistake or error; (sermon, p. 45.) God must view the natural tendency, which things have to promote the happiness of the creatures, in order to judge what is right and what is wrong, what is good and what is evil, what is the creatures duty to pursue, and what is a sin for him to pursue; and what are the *best*, the *propereft*, and *the most effectual* means of his promoting the happiness of his creatures.

That

That God annexes penalties only for the good of the creatures; and the only end of punishment is the good of those on whom it is inflicted; or at least for the good of the system of moral agents in general."-----That to be perfect as God is perfect, and to be followers of God as dear children, we must not do all (or any thing) for the glory of God, but for our own and other creatures happiness. We must live to ourselves, and serve the creature.-----That as "sin is nothing else but the creature's not pursuing his own interest, (or happiness) so well as he might," it is not a violation of infinite obligations, to love, honor and obey God; and hence, it is not an infinite evil, that deserves everlasting punishment, or eternal death and destruction from the presence of the lord; it is not what God infinitely hates, but he might have *well and wisely* overlooked it, in his grand pursuit of the happiness of his creatures; to be sure, there was no absolute need, that an infinite person should become mediator, and suffer death for our offences, in human nature, to reconcile sinners, not to God, but to their own interest and happiness, to engage them to pursue that better, and more steadily for the future. It is common for men of this scheme, to deny both the eternal and essential divinity of Christ, and his satisfaction or atonement.

Again,



Again, If there is no medium, betwixt actual kindness and positive cruelty in God, and, if punitive justice is only a branch or mode of goodness, not a quality really distinct from kindness and benevolence; then these things will follow, viz. that if Christ suffered the penalty for us, he suffered an actually kind and merciful punishment, and God was actually kind and merciful to him, in inflicting it upon him; but what moral necessity was there of an atonement to be made, by suffering an actually kind and merciful punishment, in order that sinners might be forgiven, or discharged from an obligation to suffer such a punishment? if you deny just punishment to be positive cruelty, you can't deny it to be actual kindness, without denying your own principle or assertion: and if you will retain your principle, and yet deny that Christ suffered an actually kind and merciful punishment; then, in consequence of your principle, you must deny that Christ suffered any punishment in the stead of sinners; and so deny with the *Socinians*, the satisfaction or atonement of Christ; except you will say, he suffered a positively cruel and unmerciful punishment; but then, as such a punishment is not a just punishment, suffering of it could make no satisfaction either to justice or kindness, but only to cruelty. Also, it follows, that the wicked in the other world will either, eternally suffer an actually kind  
and

and merciful punishment; or a positively cruel and unmerciful punishment, or else no punishment at all: If you deny the *first* and *second*, you must, in consequence of your principles assert and maintain the last: and indeed, from some hints in your sermons, more especially, from what you say, from p. 89, to the end of your book, some have concluded, that you don't believe the punishment of the wicked in the other world will be endless in duration: But passing from that; it is most certain, that according to these principles, there was no moral necessity of atonement in order to forgiveness, to be made by an infinite person's suffering in our nature, the penalty of the law, for us, or in our room and stead: For, according to these principles, what is the law transgressed, but the law of self interest and common good? or the natural tendency that things have, to promote the happiness of the creature? what is sin, but a transgression of the law of self interest and common good? it is not against God, as a transgression of a law of holiness, and as implying any malignity to, or enmity against the perfections of God; it is only an error from the path of happiness. What is the penalty for sin, but some actually kind and merciful chastisement for the good of the creatures; or to make them more watchful to keep the path of happiness for the future? and what is punitive justice, but only

a branch or mode of goodness, not a quality really distinct from kindness: it is only another name for goodness; and therefore, as it is *goodness itself that gives the blow*, we are sure, that it will be an actually kind and merciful one! the sufferer will be able to bear it, it will not destroy him soul and body in hell for ever: for justice would lose its essential nature and quality of actual kindness, and degenerate into positive cruelty, if it should destroy the sinner soul and body in hell for ever; therefore, there was no moral necessity of the atonement of Christ in order to forgiveness!

These are some of the very important consequences, which follow from your principles or assertions; I don't suppose, it is very agreeable to you, to have them pointed out to the world; for in your letter, p. 9, 10, speaking of my inferring from your notion of punitive justice in God, that every act of it, must be intended for the good of the individual on whom it terminates, you cry out, "now, are you not ashamed Mr. *Cleveland*, of such pervariation as this?" I might reply, that if you are not ashamed of the premises, why should I be ashamed to point out the just consequence from them? perhaps, you'll say, the consequence is not just: but how does it appear? why, say you, "I expressly guarded against the supposition, that all acts

of punitive justice, whether in God or man, are acts of kindness to the suffering individuals." But this don't help you: for, if there is no medium betwixt actual kindness and positive cruelty, and punitive justice is actual kindness, it must follow, that if every act of punitive justice in God, is not an act of kindness to the suffering individuals, there must be two kinds of punitive justice in God; the one, a branch of kindness, every act of which, is an act of kindness to the suffering individuals: the other, positive cruelty, every act of which, is an act of positive cruelty to the suffering individuals.----I know, there is vindictive justice, that is neither actual kindness nor positive cruelty to the suffering individuals; this, in God, is a divine attribute, distinct from the attribute of goodness; and this is the justice, which, I understand, you would have, *wholly and for ever excluded*.-----But you'll say, perhaps, tho' every act of punitive justice, is not an act of kindness to the suffering individuals, yet as the inflicting of punishment tends, *by way of example and terror* to positive good; at least, the publick or common punitive justice, must be a branch or mode of kindness, *a quality not really distinct from kindness, only another name for goodness*: this seems to be the purport of the several passages in your letter, p. 10, 11, quoted from your sermons: but this can't help you, so long as you maintain, that there is no  
medium

medium betwixt actual kindness and positive cruelty; for if punitive justice, in every act of it, is not actual kindness to the suffering individuals, as you now say, it must be positive cruelty unto them, according to this your assertion.

But as to this argument, *viz*, that punitive justice must be a branch of kindness, or of the quality of kindness, because the inflicting punishment tends, by way of example and terror, to positive good, at least the public or common; I would enquire, whether the inflicting of punishment, is an act of punitive justice, and an act of kindness, in one and the same particular view? for if it is, then every act of punitive justice, must be an act of kindness to the suffering individuals, and punitive justice, *is only another name for kindness*: but if every act of punitive justice, is not an act of kindness to the suffering individuals, than the inflicting of punishment may not be termed an act of punitive justice, and an act of kindness, in one and the same particular view; and if it may not, then it will follow, that punitive justice is not a branch of kindness, but may be a quality really distinct from kindness:-----the inflicting of punishment on sinners, is an act of punitive justice in this particular view, *viz*. *it is their just due, the proper wages of sin; punitive justice punishes for sin only, and in due measure only:*

as Christ stood in our law-place, he suffered for our sins, and was delivered for our offences; *he bore our sins in his own body on the tree*: as Christ stood in our law-place, the inflicting of punishment on him, was an act of punitive justice, but no act of kindness to him: but the inflicting of punishment is an act of kindness in another and quite different view, *viz.* on sinners, as it gives warning to others, by way of example and terror, to take heed lest they fall; and as it ascertains what punishment they must look for, if they should sin in like manner; on Christ, as thereby, a door of forgiveness, reconciliation with God, and eternal salvation, is opened to the sinful, guilty, and perishing children of men; you will say, surely to give warning to reasonable creatures, and to open a door of salvation to perishing men, are acts of kindness! I grant the same in both instances. but the question is, whether they are acts of punitive justice to those, to whom they are acts of kindness, and also considered as acts of kindness? If you assert they are, then you must maintain, *first*, that the giving of this warning, by way of example and terror, was an act of kindness *justly due* from God to his creatures; for if God was under no obligation in point of justice, to give his creatures this warning, his doing it is no act of justice to them; but if this warning is due to the creatures in general, why was it not al-

so to such as fall, before their fall? or was God under a necessity to permit some to fall, that by punishing them, he might give the rest of his creatures that warning by way of example and terror, which was their *just due* from him? and *secondly*, you must maintain, the opening of a door of salvation to sinful perishing men, was an act of kindness *justly due* from God to them; that God was under obligation in point of justice to the children of men, to open a door of salvation for them; otherwise, his doing it, as it is an act of kindness, is no act of justice to them: and to say they are acts of *punitive justice* to those, to whom they are acts of kindness, implies, that they are acts of *just punishment*, considered as acts of kindness, even to those, to whom they are acts of kindness: but will you, Doctor, affirm, that the giving this warning to the creatures in general, and the opening of a door of salvation to the children of men, are acts of *just punishment* to them respectively? but if you deny these to be acts of punitive justice to those, to whom they are acts of kindness, and deny them to be acts of just punishment, considered as acts of kindness, even to those, to whom they are acts of kindness, your argument to prove punitive justice to be a branch of kindness, or a quality not really distinct from kindness, utterly fails, it is given up.

But

But while you hold punitive justice to be a branch of goodness, and that there is no medium betwixt actual kindness and positive cruelty, it is neither *dishonesty* nor *impudence*, to represent it to the world as implied in your doctrine, *that every act of punitive justice in God, is an act of kindness to the individual punished; (in case, it is not an act of cruelty;)* as you suggest in p. 11: you there call my doing this *dishonesty* and *impudence*; but how do you make it to appear? why, say you, “you know,  
 “and have often acknowledged, particularly in p.  
 “15, that I speak of the future punishment of  
 “wicked men in the language of scripture, as *eter-  
 “nal, everlasting, &c.*” This indeed, might possibly demonstrate the thing, in case you were infallible, and could by no means be guilty of an inconsistency. But you not only call it *dishonesty* and *impudence*, but also a thing *very foolish as well as injurious*: but how does this appear? your reason stands thus, *viz.* “for, do you think, you can make the  
 “world believe, that I either asserted, or supposed,  
 “it was for the good of sinners themselves, to be  
 “*eternally* punished?” upon which, you cry out,  
 “for shame, Mr. *Cleaveland!*” but if I take your argument right, it implies, that if I thought I could make the world believe, your doctrine implied, that every act of punitive justice in God, is an act of kindness to the individual punished, I was neither  
*foolish*



*foolish nor injurious*, in giving such a representation of it to the world. Well, Sir, as I never thought it would be a hard task to make the world believe, that *two added to two makes four, or that if equal quantities be taken from equal quantities, the quantities remaining will be equal*; so I thought, they would as readily believe, that if punitive justice is only a branch of goodness, and not a quality really distinct from kindness, and if there is no medium betwixt actual kindness and positive cruelty,---*that every act of punitive justice in God, is an act of kindness to the individual punished*: this is what I verily thought, they would believe to be a just and natural consequence; and therefore, seeing you sometimes speak of the future punishment of wicked men, in the language of scripture, *as eternal, everlasting, &c.* that they must believe, either, that you have never well weighed your principles; or, if you have, that you don't believe, the future punishment of wicked men will be eternal; and that you speak of it in scripture language, *as eternal, everlasting, &c.* only as a *blind* to the people:----you know how this is.

Towards the bottom of p. 11, you say, I proceed upon the same known false supposition, when I so pertly demand, p. 10, *&c.* and after quoting the demand, cry out, p. 13, "fye! Mr. Cleaveland." What you call the *same known false supposition*, is,  
that

that God's punitive justice, is positive kindness, or, that all his acts of punishing, are acts of kindness to the individuals punished; now, to prove this to be a known false supposition, from your principles; you suggest, that according to your principles, there are two kinds of just punishment, the one, is for the real good of such as are punished, and this you call *disciplinary correction, or medicinal punishment*; the other sort, is when persons are punished, by way of *terror, example, and warning* to others, as malefactors are in the case of capital punishment, in which case, the suffering individuals are *not benefited, nor designed to be benefited thereby*, but to be cut off and destroyed. And therefore, *all acts* of punitive justice, are not acts of kindness to the individuals punished: but, if according to your principles, there are two kinds of just punishment, must there not also be two kinds of punitive justice! and if these two kinds of just punishment, are distinguished by one's being for the real good of the suffering individuals; and the other being not for their real good, but their utter and everlasting destruction; then, according to your principle, *viz.* that there is no medium betwixt actual kindness and positive cruelty, these two kinds of punitive justice, must be distinguished thus, *viz.* *the one is a branch of goodness and actual kindness; but the other, is a branch of positive cruelty and unmercifulness*: And if these

two kinds of punitive justice thus distinguished, are supposed to be in God, does not this “unite, in some sort, the two independent and opposite principles of the *Manichæans*, the one good, and the other evil, into one self-contradictory being whom,” &c. as you speak in your sermons, p. 37.

In the same page, where you speak of these two kinds of just punishment, you intimate, that Christ in the room, place, or stead of sinners, suffered, in order to prevent our suffering personally, by way of example and warning, as malefactors do in the case of capital punishment; that is, he suffered that kind of punishment, which is positive cruelty, according to the above distinction:---but in the very next page, (p 13.) you speak of a *divine justice* IN GENERAL, that the sufferings of Christ had reference unto, as *satisfaction* or *atonement*; this *general justice*, or *justice in general*, does not comprize the common idea of vindictive justice, which according to the common supposition, is a divine attribute entirely distinct from goodness, as from truth, or any other attribute; for this, you say, is “a particular notion of justice, for which you suppose, there is no foundation in reason or scripture.” Compare letter, p. 13, and sermon, p. 64 and 65. Therefore, this *general justice*, must comprize these two kinds before mentioned, the  
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one,

one, a branch of actual kindness; and the other, a branch of positive cruelty: and hence, as the sufferings of Christ had reference to this *justice in general*, as satisfaction or atonement, we must conclude, that Christ suffered at once both an actually kind, and a positively cruel punishment, to prevent our personally suffering the like for ever.

So long as you retain your strange notions under consideration, and reject the common conception of divine justice, nothing but darkness and confusion are in your paths, and attend all your steps. And tho' you frequently say in your letter, that you don't deny a moral necessity of atonement in order to forgiveness; and that divers things in your sermons imply such a necessity of it; it only serves to expose your inconsistency, while you retain such principles, as necessarily imply a non-necessity of atonement.-----I will set before you an instance of this kind. In your sermons, p. 63, you say, in an objection, "if God be thus perfectly good and merciful in his nature, (*i. e.* if his goodness comprehends his justice, not as a distinct attribute from, but as one mode or branch of goodness,) why did he not forgive the sins of men *without any sacrifice*? what occasion was there for *any atonement*, upon these principles? *q. d.* what moral necessity was there for any atonement upon these principles?" In your answer, you say, "we are assured

“ assured in the holy scriptures, that God forgives  
 “ the sins of men, thro’ this great sacrifice (of  
 “ Christ) interveening, *rather* than without any.”  
 I say, “ but why did God chuse to do it with a sa-  
 “ crifice, *rather* than without any?” Essay, p. 11.  
 In your letter, p. 15, you reply, “ *what impudence*  
 “ *is this!* did I not plainly inform you why, both  
 negatively and positively?” Well; your negative  
 reason is, “ not because he is in his own nature *de-*  
 “ *ficient in goodness*, or not perfectly merciful,” *de-*  
 “ *ficient in goodness*, for what? why to forgive sin with-  
 out any sacrifice? he could have done it consistent-  
 ly with his goodness without any sacrifice, there  
 was no moral necessity of atonement in order to  
 forgiveness, arising from the goodness of God, tho’  
 it comprehends his justice; as you often say, and  
 his moral perfections, are *all summarily comprehended*  
*in goodness*, as you say in your letter, p. 14, and  
 that goodness *comprises the whole moral character of*  
*God, even his justice*, as in p. 16. God is in his own  
 nature *sufficient in goodness*, to do any thing that is  
 not inconsistent with his goodness, or with his  
 whole moral character, and therefore, if it was not  
 inconsistent with the goodness of God, as it com-  
 prises his whole moral character, to forgive sin  
 without any sacrifice or atonement, what moral ne-  
 cessity was there of atonement in order to forgi-  
 veness? Your negative reason is quite agreeable to  
 your

your principles; but not so your positive reason: for this contains a principle of the common reformed system; and stands thus, *viz* “ but because he  
 “ is infinitely wise as well as merciful; taking such  
 “ a method herein, as is in its nature admirably adapted to *magnifie the law and make it honourable*;  
 “ *i. e.* to beget and preserve in the minds of reasonable creatures, a just sense of God’s authority, the dignity of his laws and government.” This implies vindictive justice in God, and even such as is no branch of kindness, but such; as we say, Christ died to satisfy, that sinners might be pardoned: for according to this your positive reason, if there had been no atonement made by the sacrifice of Christ, there could have been no forgiveness of sin, consistently with the preservation of God’s authority, the dignity of his laws and government: either sin must not be pardoned without an atonement; or God’s authority, the dignity of his laws and government, must not be preserved and vindicated: but if the latter must be preserved and vindicated, by executing the penalty to the full satisfaction of infinitely offended justice, there was a moral necessity of the atonement of Christ in order to forgiveness, consistently with God’s moral character.

The sum of these two reasons amounts to this, *viz. q. d.* “ of the two, God choose to forgive sin  
 “ with,

“ with, *rather* than without any sacrifice, not be-  
 “ cause there was any moral necessity of atonement  
 “ in order to forgiveness, arising from the essenti-  
 “ al goodness, the whole moral character of God;  
 “ for there was no occasion of any sacrifice, upon  
 “ my peculiar principles: but because there was a  
 “ moral necessity of atonement in order to forgi-  
 “ veness, according to the principles of the com-  
 “ mon reformed system of Christianity.”

But in your letter, p. 14, speaking in reference  
 to this expression, viz. “ of the two he chose *ra-*  
 “ *ther* to do it with, than without any,” you say,  
 “ which evidently amounts to this, that *of the two*  
 “ God chose to act as *became* an infinitely wise and  
 “ perfect being, *rather* than to act as did not *become*  
 “ such an one!” which implies, that if God had  
 forgiven sin without any atonement, he would not  
 have acted as did become an infinitely wise and per-  
 fect being, hence there was a moral necessity, aris-  
 ing from the infinite perfection of God, of atone-  
 ment in order to forgiveness; and that such as plead  
 for the non-necessity of atonement, do in effect  
 plead, that God might, without any inconsistency  
 with his infinite perfection, have acted, as did not  
 become an infinitely wise and perfect being! But if  
 it did not become an infinitely wise and perfect be-  
 ing to forgive sin, without the sacrifice or atone-  
 ment

ment of Christ, then forgiving of sin thro' this great sacrifice interveening, is the only method becoming a being of infinite wisdom and perfection; and hence the only *wise* and *good*, *fit* and *congruous*, *beneficent* and *gracious* method: to forgive sin without the atonement of Christ, is a method of forgiveness, neither *wise* nor *good*, because not becoming a being infinitely wise and perfect; therefore, we are sure, that it never came into his heart, to forgive sin without this sacrifice of Christ, and the holy scriptures no where give the least hint that it did; tho' you say, we are assured in the *holy scriptures*, that God forgives the sins of men, thro' this great sacrifice interveening, *rather* than without any." and a little lower, say, "there was a fitness and congruity in it, as the *wisest* and *best* method for saving sinful men." Serm. p. 64. Taking these two passages together, they evidently amount to this, that God having determined to forgive the sins of men; and there being but two ways in which he might do it, the one, without any sacrifice, the other thro' the great sacrifice of Christ interveening; and tho' the *former*, was a wise and good method, yet; because there was not so great a fitness and congruity, in this, as the *wisest* and the *best* of the two, as there was in the latter, he chose the *latter* rather than the *former*, and we are assured of this in the



In your letter, p. 17, you say, my allowing, (as I do in *essay*, p. 43,) that you assert, there was a necessity of God's forgiving the sins of men thro' Christ's atonement, if he did it at all, *intirely overthrows the grand indictment brought against you*: but I say no; and for this reason, *viz.* when you assert the moral necessity of atonement, it is upon principles contained in our system, which necessarily imply such divine justice in God, as you reject, or for which you suppose, there is no foundation in reason or scripture: I refer to your *positive reason*, just now considered.

But my comment on the harmless word *rather*, as it stands in the passage before cited, seems to give you great uneasiness. And in order (as I suppose) to shake off that uneasy sensation, you take up the greatest part of three pages (p. 18 --- 20) in commenting on the word *rather*, in several passages of *holy scripture*, in my own way, as you say giving the word *RATHER* in these passages, *precisely the same signification and force, as I have given it in your sermons*: but it appears to me, you only thrust the thorn the deeper into your own foot; for it must be observed, 1, that it is no where intimated in holy scripture, concerning the two things in competition, in the several passages you comment on, that one, is wise and good, but the other, is rather wiser and better,  
OF

or of the two, is the wisest and best; but the one is positively wrong, and the other positively right; the one evil, the other good; the one disagreeable to the moral perfections and will of God, but the other agreeable thereto: but do you say any thing in your sermons, (when speaking agreeable to your own principles) that implies to forgive sin without atonement, is wrong, disagreeable to the moral character of God, and contrary to the eternal rule of right? yea, don't some of your expressions evidently imply the contrary? you say, "God forgives the sins of men thro' this great sacrifice intervening, rather than without any, not because *he is in his own nature deficient in goodness, or not perfectly merciful,*" which if you speak sense, is to say, *not because it was disagreeable to, or inconsistent with the essential goodness of God, to forgive sin without atonement,* which goodness, you say, comprehends punitive justice, and comprizes the whole moral character of God, and if so, the eternal rule of right too. Also you say, "there was a fitness and congruity (in forgiving sin thro' the sacrifice of Christ) as the *wisest and best* method.--- You mention two methods, but the method God chose, has a fitness and congruity in it, not because *of the two*, it is the only method that is *wise and good*, and agreeable to God's moral character; but because *of the two*, it is the *wisest* and the *best*; the other method is *wise and good*,

but this *of the two*, is rather the *wisest* and *best*; and therefore, 1. is the *fittest* and most *congruous*. And 2, With regard to all the cases you here mention and comment on, it is certain, that some chose the *wrong* and refused the right, or chose the evil and refused the good. *ex. g.* Some chose *rather* to dwell in the tents of wickness, than to be door keepers in the house of God. Some chose to fear those that can only kill the body, *rather* than to fear God. Some chose to serve mammon as their master, rather than to serve God; and some chose to have fellowship with the unfruitful works of darkness, *rather* than to reprove them. But do such persons *act well* and *wisely* in the lowest degree! or don't it rather *prove*, that they are altogether corrupt and depraved, and, that they chose to act thus, rather than right, because this is wholly agreeable to their corrupt and depraved dispositions, but the other is not? And have not the best of men, while in the body, a temptation which they must watch against, to chose the evil and refuse the good, by reason of the remainder of corrupt nature in them! and will they have this temptation, when they are freed from the being of sin, and their day of trial is at an end! 3, If you apply these several cases to the case in your sermons as a parallel, you must suppose, to forgive sin without atonement, would have been disagreeable to the moral nature of God; and that God had a tempta-

tation or trial, whether it was the wisest and the best to act agreeably, or disagreeably to his moral nature, but upon deliberation chose *rather* to act agreeably, than disagreeably thereto ; because he saw it to be the wisest and the best, to act as did become a being infinitely wise and perfect ! But dare you Sir, say, that God ever had a temptation to act disagreeably to his moral nature, or as did not become a being infinitely wise and perfect ! But though you allow, (as I observed before) that God would not have acted as did become a being infinitely wise and perfect, if he had forgiven sin, without the sacrifice of Christ ; yet your particular principles, (as I have had occasion to observe) plainly suppose, that there is nothing in the goodness of God, as it comprehends justice, and comprises the whole moral character of God, which forbids the pardon of sin, without the sacrifice of Christ ; and therefore God might have done it, without acting disagreeably to his moral nature.

In your letter, p. 13, you explain of my representing your words, as if you had deny'd, in general terms, any justice in God, to which the satisfaction (atonement) of Christ had reference, in order to forgiveness ; to which I shall only say, the common idea of vindictive justice, as an attribute distinct from the attribute of goodness, you reject,

(if

(if I can understand you) which is the only kind of divine justice, that the atonement of Christ had reference to as satisfaction: and you substitute in the room of it, a notion of divine justice, that it is only a branch or mode of goodness or kindness; but to say, the satisfaction of Christ, had reference to such a kind of divine justice, in order to forgiveness, is contrary to common sense.

In p. 22, you complain, that I slander you, "as if you excluded divine justice." I shall only refer you and my readers, to your sermons p. 64, 65, and to what I have already said in this letter, in reference to your notion of divine justice.

In your letter, p. 24, speaking of *attribute* and *quality* as synonymous, you ask, "what would be the material and precise difference, between one person's saying of Mr. *Cleaveland* of *Ipswich*, that the *attribute* or property of *self conceit*, is very conspicuous in him, and another's saying the *quality* of *self conceit* is so?" But pray Sir, you know, or you ought, according to your *stile*, that the term *attribute* in *divinity*, is appropriated as sacred to God, to signify an essential perfection of his nature, such as *wisdom*, *power*, *holiness*, &c. and is not (in *divinity*) applied to creatures, to signify any thing belonging to them, either good or bad;

but the term *quality* is applied to creatures, not to express what is essential to their being as creatures, but what is morally good or morally evil in them, and which they may loose, and yet remain creatures, as man lost the good quality of *love* to God, and is filled with the evil quality of *enmity* against God; and in regeneration, the reigning power of this evil quality is destroyed, and yet the subject of these qualities, remains the same individual creature. but if God should lose *the attribute* of *wisdom* or *justice* or *truth*, or any other, he would lose *his being*, his *essence*, and cease to be. You may say, the *divine qualities*, such as *holiness*, *justice*, *goodness* and *truth*, are in every true saint; but not, that the *divine attributes*, such as *holiness*, &c. are in any mere creature: and therefore, for either of us, while speaking of the attributes of God, to turn about and say, the *attribute* of *self-conceit* is very conspicuous in such a person, would be, at least, quite profane.

In the last mentioned page, speaking in reference to what I say, of your calling the divine attributes *parts of God*, *parts of his essence*, you say, “ now, “ what foundation had you for this, besides a passage, in which I expressly spoke of the impropriety of ascribing parts to God?” But Sir, I referred you to p. 11, where you say, “ and if “ God

“ God can neither acquire any property or attribute, which did not originally and necessarily belong to him. *as part of his essence, &c.*” And tho’ in the next page you allow, there may be an impropriety in that manner of expression, concerning the infinite God, yet as you do express yourself in that manner more than once, you either thought it a proper manner of speaking, or else allowed yourself to speak in an improper manner, concerning the infinite God.

In p. 25, 26, you attempt to vindicate yourself, from the inconsistency charged upon you, in calling divine justice a particular moral attribute distinguished, and your asserting, as it were, in the very next breath, that it was only a different branch or mode of goodness: but in the beginning of p. 27, check yourself for “ *descending* (perhaps you mean *condescending*) to reason with a man, whom you was only to reprove and chastise.” But pray, Sir, how can you offer reasonable reproof, without offering some proper arguments of conviction? I question whether *a general of an army* would act in character, if he should *reprove* and *chastise* one of his *subalterns*, for a supposed crime, before he had been convicted by a fair trial? If you had said, your business was only to rail, vilify, scold and the like, you might have check’d yourself for descending to reason;

son; for a person void of reason, being drunk with either pride or passion, may be the most expert at this.

But to come to your reasoning, it must be observed you ground it on this, viz. that tho' "it is com-  
 mon to speak of justice in man, as a moral virtue,  
 distinct from charity or love, which is frequently  
 spoken of as another moral virtue; yet, it is cer-  
 tain, love or charity, considered in the largest  
 and most comprehensive sense of it, includes  
 not only justice, but all other moral and social  
 virtues." But the question is, whether justice  
 ceases to be a particular moral virtue, distinct from  
 the particular moral virtue, called love or charity,  
 when love in its largest sense, is considered, as com-  
 prehending all particular moral virtues, and *justice*  
 with the rest? or whether it is sense, to say, that  
 tho' justice and love, are particular moral virtues di-  
 stinguished, yet justice is no distinct moral virtue  
 from love, it is only a different branch or mode of  
 the moral virtue of love, *spoken of in a general way?*  
 for in this manner you speak of, what you call par-  
 ticular moral attributes distinguished, in your ser-  
 mons p. 19, 20, and particularly of justice; you  
 first say, it is a particular moral attribute distinguish-  
 ed, but as it were in the next breath, in effect, say,  
 it is no particular moral attribute, but only one  
 branch



branch or mode of goodness ; and this latter is the opinion you labour to establish, against the common opinion or conception, that it is a particular moral attribute, distinct from goodness: you may remember what I say, in my *essay*, p. 55. in reference to this, to which I refer you and my readers. But if you can prove, that tho' justice in man is a particular moral virtue, distinct from the particular moral virtue called love or charity ; yet, when it is spoken of as comprehended in love, *it is no particular moral virtue distinct from, but only one branch or mode, of the particular moral virtue called love or charity ;* I will allow you reason to purpose.

But tho' you say, the apostle *Paul* often speaks of charity in this comprehensive sense, but most expressly, Rom. xiii. 8, 9; *Owe no man any thing but to love one another, for he that loveth another hath fulfilled the law. Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself ;* and that *Christian* magistrates and parents, are bound by this comprehensive command, to punish their subjects and children respectively ; yet it may be a question, whether the Apostle intended the believing *Romans*, should understand this precept, *thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself*, or, *owe no man any thing but to love one another*, to include vindictive justice, and that they might hence warrantably, in the exercise of this love, *avenge themselves ?* for in

chap.

chap. xii. 19, he expressly says, *Dearly beloved, do not avenge not yourselves; but rather give place to wrath, for it is written, vengeance is mine, I will repay, saith the Lord*: parents may chastise their children, but not as parents, punish with the sword of vindictive justice. Magistrates, whether Christian or not, bear this sword, as they are the ministers of God, to execute wrath upon him that doth evil: paternal correction proceeds from love of kindness to the chastised; but vengeance, or the execution of wrath, in God, proceeds from love of righteousness, and hatred of iniquity, but not from love of kindness to those, upon whom wrath is executed. That love which is the fulfilling of this law, *thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, worketh no ill to his neighbour*, which I suppose, means, that it worketh only good; and therefore, this precept which is common to all, does not include the executing of wrath, or the evil of punishments, which is proper to the magistrate, as *the minister of God*, even as the minister of him, who has said, *vengeance is mine, I will repay*. Now your saying, as you do in p. 26, viz. “you may if you please in the next place, try your critical skill upon the apostle Paul, and endeavour to shew, that he did not understand himself, but wrote inaccurately and inconsistently,” implies at least, thus much, viz. that you would have it believed, that you understand yourself, as fully as the apostle Paul

Paul

*Paul* did himself, and wrote as accurately and consistently as he, did under inspiration, and that what I call an inaccuracy and inconsistency in you, I might for the same reason, in the apostle *Paul*; but I can't believe it as yet!

As to what you say in your letter, p. 27, I refer you back to my *essay*, p. 50-----52, and will appeal to the judicious, whether you justly infer from what I say there, that the divine goodness is *finite*, and that I have denied in effect, that God can be both *infinitely wise and infinitely good*! I allow there, that when you speak of the goodness of God, "which is itself without measure, without bounds," if you mean the absolute goodness of the divine nature, you speak truth, tho' nothing to your purpose; for this remains the same, without change, tho' the sinner perishes for ever: I added, but if you mean God's beneficence, or his good and bountiful acts towards his creatures under all circumstances supposeable, to be without *measure, without bounds*, it is neither true nor consistent, with what you say elsewhere. I then quote what you say of the goodness of God, *as it is in all its operations controul'd, directed and regulated by his wisdom, according to rule, reason and right*. And after some reasoning upon it, say, "moreover, it is impossible to think God's goodness, in its acts and operations, is without measure, without bounds, when

“ when at the same time, it is *controuled, regulated* and  
 “ *directed by wisdom, according to rule, reason and*  
 “ *right?* what is *controuled and regulated*, I thought  
 “ *was bounded and limited.*” But what is bounded and  
 limited? Divine goodness. By what? The rule of  
 wisdom, reason and right. In what respect? In its  
*acts and operations.* What follows from hence?  
 Why, you say, that *divine goodness is therefore finite,*  
 and that I will run myself into atheism, or what is  
 next a-kin to it, by denying, in effect, that *God can*  
*be both infinitely wise, and infinitely good!* These are  
 your inferences! but what I inferred, was to this  
 effect, viz. that if divine goodness, in its *acts and*  
*operations,* is bounded and limited by the rule of  
*wisdom, reason and right,* or by God’s moral recti-  
 tude, there was a moral necessity of atonement in  
 order to forgiveness, that divine goodness could not  
 exercise itself in the act of forgiveness, consistent-  
 ly with the rule of right, without an atonement, but  
 thro’ the atonement of Christ, it can. And was  
 not such a natural inference?

In your letter, p. 28, after quoting out of my  
*essay* these words, “ let us see how the doctor re-  
 conciles God’s leaving the heathen world, to un-  
 avoidable and eternal misery, with his being actu-  
 ally kind and merciful to all.” You say, “ but  
 you know, I did not allow the truth of the said  
 supposition

"supposition, nor pretend to shew it's consistency  
 "with God's goodness to all." But pray, doctor,  
 how could you say this? were you not speaking  
 under that head of discourse, which was to take a  
 cursory notice of some of the principal objections  
 against the divine goodness? the *difficulties* that oc-  
 cur in reference to what is asserted in your text,  
*that God is good to all?* sermon, p. 54. And in  
 considering the goodness of God, spoken of in your  
 text, did not you assert, "there is no medium be-  
 twixt (God's) being actually kind and merciful to  
 all, and his being positively cruel and unmerciful to  
 some?" p. 35. And did not you mention several diffi-  
 culties, which you, at least, pretended to remove or  
 reconcile, with your notion of divine goodness? And  
 did not you say in p. 65, "how shall we *reconcile*  
 the supposition, of God's leaving the whole heathen  
 world, to unavoidable and eternal misery, with in-  
 finite goodness?" that is, as we must understand  
 you, how shall we reconcile his leaving the whole,  
 or a part, with this, that *there is no medium betwixt*  
*God's being actually kind and merciful to all, and his be-*  
*ing positively cruel and unmerciful to some, without sup-*  
 posing God to be positively cruel and unmerciful, to  
 those he leaves to unavoidable and eternal misery?  
 for here lies the difficulty. And tho' you now say,  
 you did not allow the truth of the said supposition,  
 about the heathen world, nor pretend to shew its  
 consistency

consistency with God's goodness to all; yet you did say, "*first*, that it is by no means a clear and certain point, either from reason or revelation, that *all* the heathen will be actually miserable in the world to come." Had you said, that it is by no means a clear and certain point, that *any* of the heathen will be miserable in the world to come, you might now say, you disallowed the truth of the supposition, wherein the difficulty lay, that was to be removed. But as your answer implies, that some of the heathen may be miserable in the world to come, the difficulty respecting them, still remains to be removed. But you did say, "*secondly*, That if they shall be so, (i. e. all actually miserable in the world to come) they will be punished only for their sins, and in due measure only." What is this but a saying? "granting the truth of the supposition, that the whole heathen world will be miserable in the world to come, yet they will be punished only for their sins, and in due measure only?" But how does this remove the difficulty? is God actually kind and merciful to them; or is he positively cruel and unmerciful, in punishing them *only* for their sins, and in due measure only? here is the point that labours, I wonder why you mentioned this difficulty, and what you pretended to do respecting it, if you did not pretend to remove it, as you now intimate.

In p. 28 and 29, you speak as if you was quite  
 wroth, in reference to what I say, of your presum-  
 ing to tell, how God became infinitely, perfectly  
 good: but whatever your design or intention was,  
 in the passage referred to in your sermons, I will  
 leave it to others to judge, whether your positions  
 and explanation, don't necessarily imply what I observ-  
 ed upon them, without straining the natural sense  
 of your words. You say, "the fitness and reasonable-  
 ness of being so, (*i. e.* infinitely, perfectly good)  
 would undoubtedly *determine him to be so*: by  
 which last expression, (you say) I am far from  
 designing to suggest, either that there was a time  
 when God was not good, or that he might possi-  
 bly be otherwise." But, it seems, your were sen-  
 sible, your words might naturally be taken to sug-  
 gest, that there was a time when God *became per-*  
*fectly good*, or, *that his goodness is an effect*: you pro-  
 ceed, "I mean the direct contrary in both respects,  
 viz. that as this *fitness* was eternally *seen*, God  
 was eternally good, and as he *saw it necessarily*,  
 he was as necessarily good, and yet not contrary  
 to his *own will or choice*, which were a contradic-  
 tion; but in conformity thereto from eternity." Serm. p. 45. Now, if these last cited words, don't  
 necessarily imply, that God's *goodness* is as much the  
 effect of his *knowledge, will and choice*, as any thing  
 is, I must confess, I don't know what words natu-  
 rally

fully imply, I suppose, you will allow, that God eternally saw the fitness of the world's *existing*; and that as God's knowledge is infinite, eternal and equally necessary, he necessarily saw the fitness of the world's existing, and yet not contrary to his will and choice, but in conformity thereto; yea, that it does actually exist, in conformity to God's *will* or *choice*: but you will not say, the world must have eternally existed, because God eternally saw the fitness of its existing; nor that it existed necessarily without any efficient cause, because God necessarily saw the fitness of its existing: you now say, you was shewing, "an eternal, necessary connection, between omniscience, independency, omnipotence, and goodness." But will not this way of arguing in the passages quoted, as fully prove an eternal necessary connection, between omniscience and the actual existence of the world, that the world existed eternally and necessarily, and is no more the effect of God's efficient will, than his goodness is? You, indeed, speak of the existence of God, as a thing distinct from his goodness; (p. 46) "for (say you) nothing was prior, not even the *existence* of God, to his *will to be good*; or in other words, to his *goodness*: for these are the same thing in the everglorious God." But tho' your words before implied, that God's *will* was the *cause*, and his *goodness* the *effect*, yet here you make his *will to be good*,

*good,*



good, and his goodness, to be one and the same thing, tho' his existence is another thing. You must acknowledge, you ventured into water too deep for you; and therefore, you can't help talking confusedly, like a drowning man. However, it must be owned, that you allow one thing, that *Armenians* don't care to allow, viz, that *necessity* and *choice* may stand together; for say you, "God is necessarily good, not contrary to his will or choice, but in conformity thereto.... His will to be good, and his goodness, are one and the same thing." Whence it follows, that if God's goodness is necessary, his will or choice to be good is necessary.

In your letter, p. 32, you charge me with gross per-  
 varication, and even prophaneness: yea, say you,  
 "you know in your own soul, that you pervert my  
 " words and meaning." In reference to what I ob-  
 serve, (*essay*, p. 79.) upon what you say of the ter-  
 rible punishment of the wicked in the other world;  
 speaking of which, you say, "That goodness, per-  
 " fect goodness, NAY TENDER MERCY ITSELF  
 " requires this; God would not be perfectly good and mer-  
 " ciful, if he did not inflict such punishment, &c. Ser.  
 " p. 67. But first, I observe you now say, you was  
 speaking "concerning the goodness of God to his  
 " creatures in general, in punishing wicked men here  
 after, by way of example and terror." But it must be  
 remembered,

remembered, that when you speak of God's punishing wicked men *hereafter*, you refer to that *everlasting punishment*, which will be after the day of judgment, for you say, "and is it not declared, that at  
 "the great day, the wicked shall go away into everlasting punishment, in the place prepared for the devil  
 "and his angels." p. 86. And this punishment, it seems, according to you, will be, by way of example and terror, to God's creatures in general. I suppose, you mean reasonable creatures: but you will except all the fallen angels, that are in everlasting chains under darkness: for these will neither be awed to obedience, nor receive any benefit by the punishment of wicked men *hereafter*: you will except all the *righteous or good men*, for their time of probation, at the great day, will be at an end. *These shall go away into life eternal; and shall be shut in*, and therefore will stand in no need of examples of terror to keep them in awe: and if you will also except all the *elect angels*, as having passed the time of their trial; and entered into a confirmed estate of everlasting felicity, and therefore, as standing in no need of examples of terror; you must look for some other species of reasonable creatures, besides *angels and men*, even such as the holy scriptures makes no mention of, as God's *creatures in general*, for whose good he shall punish wicked men *hereafter*, by way of example and terror.

There

There are three things, one of which it is necessary for you to prove, in order to support your hypothesis, viz. either, 1, that reasonable creatures, after their time of probation is over, and they are entered into a fixed estate of eternal felicity, will stand in eternal need of examples of terror to keep them loyal: or, 2, that God's reasonable creatures in general, will be in an eternal state of probation, as needing examples of terror and warning: or else, 3, that the punishment of wicked men hereafter, will last no longer than the probation-time of reasonable creatures in general: and in case, you shall chuse to assert the last, (as is most likely) then I must ask; setting the case, that all reasonable creatures, were obstinately wicked and impenitent, whether it would be just with God, as lord and judge of all, to punish all for their sins in due measure? or with, that measure of punishment, as to weight and duration, as it would the wicked, that were but a part, a minor part of God's creatures? if you shall say yes, then it would be just with God to punish wicked men hereafter for their sins in due measure, whether he did it by way of example and terror, or not; his punishing by way of example and terror, is only a circumstance, that neither alters the nature of the punishment, nor adds any thing to the degree and duration of it; and if so, punitive justice is not a branch of goodness in itself, not even to

God's creatures in general; nor can it be said that *tender mercy itself requires such punishment*:----but if you shall say no to my question; than the good and happiness of the creatures in general, is the supream rule of justice, and the obstinately wicked and impenitent must be punished no more, nor longer than will be for the good and happiness of God's creatures in general: this is quite agreeable to your principles, which I have before taken notice of.----

*Secondly*, I observe you say, that I wickedly wrest your words as if you had said, that God would therein be good and merciful even to those, whom he will destroy soul and body in hell.---But how can you say this is a wickedly wresting your words? don't you say, "there is no medium betwixt  
 " (God's) being actually kind and merciful to *all*,  
 " and his being positively cruel and unmerciful to  
 " *some*?"---That "punitive justice is only a branch  
 " or mode of goodness?" that it is "not a quality  
 " really distinct from kindness?" And, speaking of the terrible punishment of wicked men *hereafter*, don't you say, "goodness, perfect goodness; nay  
 " *tender mercy itself* requires this; God would not  
 " be perfectly good and merciful, if he did not inflict  
 " such punishment, &c.?" Now, putting all these together, don't they naturally import, *that God is actually kind and merciful to the wicked in the other world, in punishing them with such a terrible punishment;*  
 both

*both as to nature and duration, as tender mercy itself requires?---But if the objects of tender mercy itself are the miserable, according to the common sense of mankind; how is it consistent with common sense, to say, tender mercy itself requires such punishment, as will destroy them soul and body in hell? or, as will make the objects of tender mercy, as miserable as they can be? But if by the objects of tender mercy itself, you don't intend such as are in a perishing condition, but such as are in a state of innocence and happiness; and that your meaning is, that tender mercy itself to the innocent and happy, to prevent their sinning and becoming miserable, requires such punishment as will destroy the miserable soul and body in hell, and that God would not be perfectly good and merciful to the innocent and happy, if he did not inflict such punishment on the miserable; then, if there is no medium betwixt actual kindness and positive cruelty, it will follow; that God would not be perfectly good and merciful to the innocent and happy, if he were not positively cruel and unmerciful to the wicked and miserable; nay, that tender mercy itself towards the innocent and happy, requires that he should be positively cruel and unmerciful to the wicked and miserable. But if your meaning is, that the good and happiness of the creatures in general, is the great end that God aims at;---and that God would not be perfectly good and merciful, if he did*

not prevent the creatures in general from falling and becoming miserable; and *tender mercy itself*, required that some of the creatures should be permitted to fall into sin and misery, that terrible punishment might be inflicted upon these, in order to prevent the creatures in general from falling into sin and misery: (if this is not your meaning, I don't know what it is; but if it is) how is it consistent with common sense? yea, how is it consistent with what you say in sermon, p. 34, 35, viz. "that God is like-  
 " wise good and kind, to all the *individuals* of which  
 " these *species* consist.---It is not very easy for com-  
 " mon sense to conceive, how an *whole* or a *species*  
 " can be *kindly* provided for by the God of all;---  
 " and yet the *parts*, the *individuals* be disregarded  
 " and neglected by him.---A providential care of  
 " the *species*, evidently involves the like care of the  
 " *individuals* thereof; at least, of *some* of them, and  
 " if God takes care of *some*, why not *all*?" Here let me add, that if God would not be perfectly good and merciful, in case he should not prevent the *system* of moral agents in general from falling into sin and misery, why was not he obliged from his perfect goodness to take the like care of all the parts, the individuals of this whole--this system of moral agents? if he *must* prevent the ruin of his creatures in general, otherwise he would not be perfectly good and merciful,  
 why

why not---of all the individuals in particular? If the *whole* consists of individuals, why have not all these individuals an equal right, one as much as another, to the preventing goodness and mercy of God? but if every individual has an equal right, and yet God might, without any inconsistency with his perfect goodness and mercy, permit one individual to fall, he might two, he might a million, yea he might every one: and hence if you can't deny, that God has not prevented some from falling, you can't maintain that he is under obligation from his perfect goodness and mercy, to prevent his creatures in general from falling: nor that the great end of his permitting some to fall, and his inflicting everlasting punishment upon them, is the good and happiness of his creatures in general, or that he might be perfectly good and merciful to them?

Your letter is very full of charges of very high crimes, even of such moral evils as my very soul abhors, for instance, *lying, dishonesty, wilful falsehood, villany, forgery, &c. &c. &c.* and in some places you speak of them as *proved* upon me,---that you have *proved* me guilty of them, see p. 37, and 41. Your proof is what I shall now take notice of.

The first instance I observe is in p. 6, where you charge me with *villany*, for *representing* you to the world,

world, as an *enemy* to the *most* important principles of the protestant religion, particularly the doctrine of Christ's sacrifice and atonement, &c. and for saying you cast injurious aspersions on it ; you refer to the title page of my *essay*. But my words are, " to defend *some* of the most important principles, &c." Now if there is a difference in the sense, between " the most important," as you quote, and " *some* of the most important," as I wrote it, you ought to remember it. And tho' I did not use the term *enemy* there, yet that you are an enemy to some of the most important principles in the protestant reformed system, you have yourself sufficiently evidenced in your writings\*, and in effect own in your letter,

\* The doctor says, " it is manifest, that law not *tempered* and *relaxed* by grace, must condemn all those that fall short of the perfection required by it." See his book of sermons, printed 1755, p. 194. If he intends, that the moral law is so relaxed by the grace of God in the gospel, that God will now accept of an imperfect righteousness for justification, in the room of a perfect one, he is an enemy to a most important principle of the protestant religion.

He also says, " that the scripture teaches no such *doctrine* as that of God's *imputing* the perfect righteousness of Christ, to sinners for justification." Ibid. p. 147, margin. Whoever reads these sermons, can't but see that the doctor makes, *obedience to the gospel*, the matter of the sinner's acceptance with, and justification before God.



letter, p. 37. And that you have cast injurious aspersions on the moral necessity of Christ's atonement, appears by your advancing principles, that not only imply a non-necessity of atonement in order to forgiveness, but in "their important consequences," make the atonement of Christ the true God, a ridiculous thing! this sufficiently appears from what has already been said. Now, if it is not *villanous* for a person to publish to the world his own sentiments, tho' contrary to the common orthodox system,

It is quite evident, that the doctor does not allow, the *logos*, the word, (John, i. 1.) the second person in the godhead, (1 John, v: 7.) to be truly God equally with the father, to be an eternal person, and that he "took into personal union with himself, a human soul." Nor, that there are three eternal persons in the godhead: see the aspersions, which he casts, especially, upon the last, in his marginal note, p. 417, 418, *ibid*. In that note he says, "It would be no great surprile to me to hear that the *Pope* and a *general council*, had declared the *B. Virgin* to be the *fourth*, or rather, the *first person* in the godhead, under the title of God, or *godde/s the MOTHER*;—that the mother is eternal, the father eternal, the son eternal, and the holy ghost eternal; but yet, &c." The protestant doctrine of the *sacred trinity*, is not too sacred to be ridiculed by him as *nonsense* and a contradiction.

He denies that men are appointed to die the *second death*, in consequence of *Adam's* first transgression; and asserts, that only men's own personal sins subject them to misery in the world to come: *Ibid*. p. 419.

system, and acknowledged by himself to be contrary to the conceptions of many wise and excellent men; how is it *villanous* for another to examine these sentiments, and to vindicate and defend the orthodox principles against them?

What you produce to prove your charge, in p. 9, 10, 11, have been sufficiently considered. But in p. 12 and 13, after quoting a passage from my *essay*, you add, “the last clauses here with double commas, you cite as *mine*; tho’ they are altered so, as not to give your readers a true idea of my meaning.” This you bring to prove, that I have *exposed the naughtiness of my heart*; now, the words I marked with double commas are these, *viz.* “*Such idea of divine justice must be wholly and for ever excluded*”

He also says, “it may, perhaps, be difficult to assign a better reason why the *song* rather than the *wisdom* of Solomon is admitted into the *canon*, than this, *viz.* that people generally love and relish SONGS, better than they do WISDOM. Ibid. p. 453, marg. which implies, that the canon of holy scripture was composed, or filled up either, by the people in general, according to their *taste*; or else, by men, that were influenced by no better motive, than the gratifying the taste of the multitude, or the people in general.”

And speaking of the supposition of wicked men’s being *annihilated*, or *utterly blotted out of being*, after suffering unutterable torments, says, it must be confessed, that some expressions of scripture, seem at first view, to countenance this supposition.” Ibid. p. 475, 476, marg.

cluded." But your very words, which you say I have altered so, as not to give my readers a true idea of your meaning, are these, viz. "in such a sense, as wholly and for ever to exclude any such idea of divine justice, as is often given us." Sermon. p. 65. Now I concluded, that if all such divine justice, "as is often spoken of, distinct in nature from goodness, to satisfy which, it is said Christ died," were wholly and for ever excluded; there would remain no divine justice in God, that forbids the pardon of sin without atonement, or that implies a moral necessity of atonement in order to forgiveness; and if your words naturally suggest such an idea, then I did not alter them, so as not to give my readers a true idea of your meaning, and consequently have not exposed the naughtiness of my heart thereby; I can truly say, I endeavoured *honestly* to represent to my readers, what I took to be the true import and meaning of those passages in your sermons referred to.

In p. 13, 14, and 15, you charge me with *perverse* and *dishonesty*, if not with *felony*, because when I quoted this assertion, viz. "we are assured in the holy scriptures, that God forgives the sins of men thro' this great sacrifice (of Christ) interceding, rather than without any." I put a *period* at the word *any*, whereas you put a *comma*, and also, because I did not quote with the assertion,

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the

the reasons which follow *negatively* and *positively*; this is the evidence you bring, to prove me guilty of *perverseſs*, *diſhoneſty*, if not *felony*. I appeal to the judicious, whether it is not very abusive, to charge me with ſuch high crimes before the world, which ſap the life of my moral character, ſupported by ſuch kind of evidence as this! As to the reaſons, had they been quoted with the aſſertion, they would have been no advantage to you, as appears from what has already been ſaid upon them. What you ſay in the laſt part of p. 15; and in p. 16, have been conſidered.

In p. 17, you, in effect, charge me with *lying*, and what you bring for the proof of it, is this paſſage out of my *eſſay*, viz. “and yet immediately adds, *there was a neceſſity of God’s doing it this way, otherwiſe he could not maintain his own authority, nor the dignity of his laws and government.*” This proves me guilty of lying, but how? why becauſe, ſay you, “I neither immediately, nor at all, added the words which you ſay I did, they are none of mine, tho’ you have formally quoted them as ſuch.” But I did not ſay they were your very words; I had juſt quoted before (in p. 42) your very words, and wrote down what I took to be their natural import, and you no where ſay I took you wrong; then (in p. 43) I mention the paſſage that

went

went before, and to shew your inconsistency in these passages, I set down what I took to be the natural import of your words in both: it is true, I don't use all your *very words*, and who would or could in a comment or paraphrase? It is also true, that this passage is marked with double commas at the beginning, but it ends with none: and tho' it is common to mark a *comment* or a *paraphrase* with double commas, yet as this only begins with them, a candid spirit would have supposed, that these were slip't in, either thro' inadvertence of the *scribe*, or as an *error* of the *press*: I could point out as great an error in your sermons, which I supposed to be an *error* of the *press* only; I must confess that it looks worse than *childish* to represent me to the world, as a person of a *very infamous character*; because the sense of your words (which you don't deny to be their natural import) is represented by other words, and happens to be marked with double commas at the beginning.

In p. 28, you produce three or four instances to prove me *false* and *knavish*: first, that I mis-quote your words, p. 57, viz. "that the truly great, noble and excellent end, which a good God hath in view, &c." these you say are none of your words, tho' I quote and comma them as if they were. But I did not deliver that passage, as being your *es-*

ry words, but as containing the *very principle* you argue from, as any one may see, and you don't deny it to be your principle, as I perceive: and you may find this principle expressed, almost in those very words, serm. p. 45 and 77. *Secondly*, you intimate, that I mis-quote you, p. 58, where speaking of you, I say, " he argues thus, to prove punitive justice to be a branch of goodness, viz." God's end must be " either positively good or positively bad, if it be " the creatures happiness, it is positively good; if " it be the creatures misery, it is positively bad " and cruel, &c." This is to prove I *fib* or *lie*! but how? why, you say, " now tho' you mark these " words as a quotation from me, I assert they are " none of mine, and in that passage in my sermon " which comes the nearest to them, (not very near) " p. 30, I was not speaking concerning punitive justice, but, &c." But, Sir, I was not quoting your very words, but representing the manner of your arguing, as any one may see, that has but half an eye: and do you deny this to be the manner of your arguing? and as to this way or manner of arguing, I can point you to some pages in your sermons, where you are speaking of punitive justice, in words nearer a-kin to what I mention than p. 30, which you refer to, viz. in p. 24, speaking of the end of punishing transgressors, you say, " and this " end must be either positively bad or positively " good:

“good:” and that you mean by the *positively good end*, the happiness of the creatures; and by the *positively bad and cruel one* their misery, may be seen in p. 22, under observation 3d, and p. 25, observation 9th. The other instances to prove me *false* and *knavisb*, in your letter p. 28, and beginning of p. 29, have been considered before.

In p. 33, you produce two instances more, to prove me guilty of *lying* and *falsbood*: the *first* is, for saying that you say, (in reference to Mr. CALVIN) “that a certain decree of reprobation, was the “known opinion of that learned man,” and for marking these words with double commas, as if they were yours: but tho’ these words might be marked with double commas thro’ inadvertance, when I was transcribing the copy for the *press*, you can’t deny, that your very words necessarily imply, that a *certain decree of reprobation, was the known opinion of that learned man*. Your words are, “that there are many “persons who, *by a supposed eternal decree of reprobation,* “are absolutely excluded” from the benefit of pardon, “----this was the known opinion of that learned man:” Now I take an *eternal decree* of reprobation to be a certain decree or an absolute decree; but you say I misrepresent you, as denying any certain decree of reprobation; but Sir, it is an eternal decree of reprobation

your own words, (letter, p. 33) you put

probation, you are speaking of there, and if there is no certain, divine decree of reprobation, but what is eternal, how did I misrepresent you as denying any certain decree of reprobation there? but you know, I allow it to be the unavoidable consequence of your positions, that “ God from eternity devoted all  
 “ that shall perish in the other world, in his absolute decree and purpose, in which he could be  
 “ subject to no mistake or error, to eternal torments, as what he saw to be the best, the properest and most effectual means requisite to his  
 “ great end, viz. the good and happiness of his household or kingdom.” *Essay*, p. 94. You have not denied this to be the unavoidable consequence of your positions:---but now you say, “ you do not  
 “ think God has decreed to damn men, but for their unrepeated sins.” P. 37. But do you intend hereby, that God decreed from eternity to damn men for their unrepeated sins? if so, you hold to an eternal decree of reprobation; and if you hold these men, by this eternal decree, are excluded from the benefit of pardon for their unrepeated sins, wherein does your sentiment differ from that of Mr. Calvin, which you declare to be, “ at once unsupported by reason or  
 “ scripture, nay contrary to both?” or, do you mean, that God has not decreed to damn a certain definite number of men for their unrepeated sins, but has decreed to damn men indefinitely, for their unrepeated sins, that is, to damn every man that  
 shall



shall happen to die with unrepented sins? then it may follow, that God has decreed to damn every mere man that dies: for, as it is said, "who can understand his errors?" It is possible, that every sinner may have some particular unrepented sins, when he dies: --- or, do you mean, that if a sinner repents of some of his sins, God has not decreed to damn him for such, but for those he does not repent of? as for instance, *Judas repented that he had betrayed the innocent blood, yet he went to his own place: now, do you mean that God did not decree to damn Judas for the sin of betraying Christ, but for his other unrepented sins, and hence that he suffers nothing in hell for that sin!* Your *second* instance in p. 33, to prove me *false*, is my saying, "but in p. 66, the doctor states the doctrine in an objection, but discovers himself disingenuous and abusive in the manner of his stating it, and then vents his indignation against the doctrine, &c." upon which you say, "now it is *false*, that I stated either the scripture, or the Calvinistic doctrine of reprobation, in the place to which you refer." Here it must be noted, that the printers left out some words in the manuscript copy they had, it stands thus in that copy, "the doctor states the doctrine *as he does* in an objection, &c." I had not the opportunity of seeing every half sheet as it came out of the press, to make the necessary corrections: but it is certain you stated the doctrine of reprobation *as you did*,

but you say it is *false* that you stated *either* the scripture, or Calvinistic doctrine of reprobation, by which *disjunction* you, in effect, deny the Calvinistic doctrine of reprobation, to be the same as the scripture doctrine of it. But however that be, were you not discoursing under the head of answering objections, or removing difficulties, which occur in reference to what is asserted in your text, *God is good to all?* and does not the Calvinistic, or the scripture doctrine of reprobation, cast some difficulty in your way that ought to deserve your notice, rather than “the absurd impious notions which some persons have of reprobation?” but while speaking of reprobation, you mention no person by name but Mr. *Calvin*, and his sentiment you declare to be, “at once, unsupported by reason or scripture; nay contrary to both, highly derogatory to the goodness and grace of God, and of dangerous tendency,” and you speak of it to the same effect, as stated by you in the objection, in your answer; tho in a more outrageous manner! And tho’ you intimate now, that you was speaking of the *absurd impious notions*, which some persons have of reprobation, yet I don’t believe you can produce one author, in which that doctrine is asserted as you have stated it in your objection; nor bring one person living, that will say, you have therein truly expressed his sentiment of the doctrine of reprobation: and I must think

think till something of this kind is produced, that the Calvinistic scripture doctrine of reprobation, was aimed at in that objection; and that it was, probably, expressed in that manner, either from *cowardice*, that you might sculk if attacked by the Calvinists, and say you did not aim at them, or from *enmity* against the doctrine, that people might abhor it for its cloathing: you know how the heathen persecutors were wont to dress up Christians.

In p. 34, you charge me with *mis-quoting* and *leaving*, for the support of which, you produce this passage out of my *essay*, viz. ‘ and as the doctor  
 “ says “ God’s knowledge (which formed his  
 “ plan”)---“ this, (say you,) is none of my expres-  
 “ sion ” I suppose you mean what is contained  
 in the *parenthesis*, which in the manuscript copy is not marked with double commas, as in the printed ones: Is n’t it hard to be charged with *leaving* or *lying* for every little error of the press? And in this same page, you say, *I am at it again in the next page*, and add, “ you there represent me, as speaking of  
 “ the *doctrine* of original sin, as the grossest of all  
 “ absurdities, &c. Now you know (say you) I said  
 “ not this of the *doctrine of original sin*, but only of  
 “ that unscriptural opinion, that *infants, infants of*  
 “ *a span long*, are justly liable to eternal torments.”

It is true, that I know you speak of *infants of a span*

long, and suppose you refer to Lam. ii. 20, where it is said, *shall the women eat their fruit, children of a span long?* and whatever idea you intend to suggest, by repeating, with such *emphasis, infants, infants of a span long!* I know you were speaking of children that were born alive, and have immortal souls, for say you, “are not their souls immortal?” And also I know you say, “to suppose, that the sin of *Adam and Eve* is or can be so imputed to them, as to render them *justly liable* to eternal misery, without any offence of their own, is one of the *grossest of all absurdities.*” Serm. p. 62, 63. And you know, according to the system of the Westminster assembly of divines, and of all sound Calvinists, that children born, having immortal souls, who descended from *Adam* by ordinary generation, *sinned in him and fell with him in his first transgression*, and are, by the fall, *under the wrath and curse of God, and liable to the pains of hell for ever*: but I don’t know, that any measure is fixed by the holy scriptures, of what length the bodies of children shall be, before, *by the offence of one, judgment shall come upon them to condemnation!* whether, they shall be *one, two, or three spans long?* Now, such men as are capable of believing the imputation of *Adam’s* first sin to his posterity, whereby they are rendered *justly liable* to eternal misery, before they have in their own persons committed any offence, you say, “are to be  
“ pitied

“ pitied as persons of a sadly depraved judgment.”  
 In the margin of my *essay*, p. 103, 104, I mention  
 who have been capable of believing this doctrine,  
 which you call the *grossest of all absurdities*: and as  
 you seem to deny the *imputation of Adam's first sin to*  
*his posterity*, to be included in the *doctrine of original*  
*sin*, I shall insert a passage here, with which the late  
 learned and judicious Mr. *EDWARDS*, begins his  
*treatise on original sin*, viz. “ By *original sin*, as the  
 “ phrase has been most commonly used by divines,  
 “ is meant the *innate sinful depravity of heart*: but  
 “ yet when the *DOCTRINE of original sin* is spoken  
 “ of, it is vulgarly understood in that *latitude*, as  
 “ to include not only the depravity of nature, but the  
 “ *imputation of Adam's first sin*: or, in other words,  
 “ the *liableness or exposedness of Adam's posterity in*  
 “ *the divine judgment*, to partake of the *punishments*  
 “ of that sin.” See p. 1, 2.

Towards the close of p. 34, you say, “ you *trifle*  
 “ and *prevaricate* shamefully again.” And in the be-  
 ginning of next page say, “ you *captiously and false-*  
 “ *ly* represent, what I say upon these different points  
 “ thus, “ he has a high veneration for many of us  
 “ as wise and excellent men, that are to be pitied  
 “ as persons of a sadly depraved judgment.” But  
 Sir, I feel almost ashamed for you, to repeat the e-  
 vidence you bring for the support of these high

charges! you know that these different points (as you call them) belong to one and the same system, and that such as believe the doctrine of the imputation of *Adam's* first sin to his posterity, do also hold divine justice to be an attribute of God, intirely distinct from the attribute of divine goodness, and as implying a moral necessity of atonement in order to forgiveness: therefore it is neither *a trifling*, nor *a prevaricating shamefully*, to apply both to the same persons: and if you say such as hold the latter are *many of them wise and excellent men*, but such as believe the former, *are to be pitied as persons of a sadly depraved judgment*; and yet those that believe the former, can't be denyed to be the same persons as hold the latter, how can you say, that I “ *captiously* and *falsely* represent you,” when I say, “ he has a high veneration for many of us as wise and excellent men, that are to be pitied as persons of a sadly depraved judgment?” If you can't deny that there were many wise and excellent men among those I referred to in my margin, who were capable of believing the doctrine of the imputation of *Adam's* first sin to his posterity, nor that these two points belong to one and the same system, you must *trifle shamefully* yourself in what you say here!

In p. 35, you say, “ you must rebuke me for  
 “ *my irreverence and profanity*, in speaking of the  
 “ great

“ great God, p. 101.” My words you refer to are, viz. “ why mayn’t the judgment of God, which by “ the offence of *Adam* came upon all men to con- “ demnation, be a just and righteous judgment? “ the doctor will not say it was the effect of a sad- “ ly depraved judgment in the Almighty.” For this you say to me, “ you are very *culpable* for your “ *impiety*, in speaking of the Almighty in this *light*, “ *steering, flouting manner.*” Now you act in character! for you can’t deny, that you stiled the doctrine of the imputation of *Adam’s* first sin to his posterity, the grossest of all absurdities; and said they, that were capable of believing such doctrine, are to be pitied as persons of a sadly depraved judgment: hence, if the inspired apostle *Paul* believed this doctrine, he was to be pitied in like manner: yea, if it was found to be a doctrine of God, in which the divine judgment is expressed in the act of imputation, what must the consequence be according to your sentence! Now as you had allowed what necessarily implied the imputation of the righteousness of Christ to believing sinners, as the ground of their pardon and receiving the gift of eternal life; (p. 83) and as you had allowed the *parallel*, which is instituted (as you say) and carried on by the apostle betwixt the *first* and *second Adam*, in his epistle to the *Romans*: (p. 89.) You could not deny, that *by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men*

to condemnation; nor that what they were condemned to, was to suffer that eternal death, which he there calls the *wages of sin*, and places in opposition to that *eternal life*, which is thro' *Jesus Christ* the *second Adam*: Now, if you could neither deny these, nor that the judgment which came upon all men to condemnation, was the judgment of God, you must maintain, while you assert the doctrine of the imputation of *Adam's* first sin,---to be one of the grossest of all absurdities, that the judgment of God herein was not a just and righteous judgment: and also, while you assert, that such as are capable of believing that doctrine, are to be pitied, as persons of a sadly depraved judgment, that the imputation of *Adams* first sin, was the effect of a sadly depraved judgment in the Almighty: or at least, you must maintain, that it is the effect of a sadly depraved judgment to be capable of believing a doctrine, tho' asserted by an inspired apostle, which our depraved hearts rise against as a *hard saying*! I will leave it to others to say, whether it does not argue want of due reverence to the Almighty, to declare such a doctrine to be one of the grossest of all absurdities, which you can't deny, (but in effect have allowed) to be asserted by an inspired apostle? and to say such men as are capable of believing it, are to be pitied as persons of a sadly depraved judgment, when you can't deny that the inspired apostle was

capable



capable of believing it, nor that Jesus Christ the son of God was capable of believing it, who came into the world to seek and save that which was lost, and which must have perished under eternal condemnation, if he had not come into the world, to give his life for the life of the world.

In the same page, you say, “ you are guilty of another falsehood, at least an implicit one, when speaking of original sin, you say, p. 101, “ hence the doctor does not state the doctrine right, when he says, *without any offence of their own.*” Upon which you say, “ you know I neither stated, nor attempted to state that doctrine;” but you stated it as you did, or at least put into a form of words, something you call a doctrine, and is included in the doctrine of original sin: and if you intended the imputation of *Adam’s* first sin to his posterity, you did not state it right, when you say *without any offence of their own*; for in this affair, *Adam*, with all his posterity are considered, *as one constituted whole*, or as *but one moral person*, and they with him are united in the same covenant, and are transgressors of the same law; therefore, “ they are also to be looked upon, as having, in a moral estimation, committed the same transgression of the law.” See Mr. Edwards on original sin, p. 328--333, with the margin.

But

But what you lay the greatest stress upon, for the proof of your high and manifold *charges of falshood, forgery, villany, knavery, lying,* and what not that is bad, is a long passage, which you have been at the expence of quoting from my *essay*, and stands in your letter, p. 29... 31; in reference to which you say, “ you have pretended to cite from me in “ a most formal manner, a long passage---and palm- “ ed the whole upon the world as *mine* --as *my* very “ words-----nor is there the least room to doubt, “ but you intended your readers, who were unac- “ quainted with my sermons, should believe you “ had extracted this passage from them *word for “ word.*” From these premises, I suppose; you intend the following conclusion, *viz, That when a writer pretends to cite a passage from an author, but does not do it in the very words of the author, or word for word as expressed by the author, he deserves to be branded, as guilty of falshood, and the very worst sort of lying: This is the rule by which you have judged me guilty of lying and wilful falshood, in divers of the instances that I have considered: say you, “ these are none of my words, though you have “ quoted them as mine,” therefore, “ you fib,” &c.* And if a writer uses words in his pretended quotations, of the same import and meaning, yet (according to this rule) it is a *mij-quotation* and a *falshood*, because it is not *word for word* as it stands in the author.

Let us in the first place, try by this rule, some passages, which, I suppose, you pretend in a formal manner to quote from the *holy scriptures*, viz. serm. p. 22, “ punishes *other* evil doers,” this you mark with double commas, but where do you find it *word for word* in the *holy scriptures*? Again, p. 49, “ offer “ himself up to God, as a lamb without blemish and “ without spot,” but in what one verse or page of the bible, do you find this standing just so, *word for word*? Again, “ infants of a span long” p. 63, but can you find this just so, *word for word*? Likewise, p. 71, “ even from *children* known the holy scriptures, “ which are able to make us wise unto salvation.” And p. 72, “ because the LORD loved us, therefore “ made he him king over *us*, to do justice and “ judgment.” Also, p. 81, “ what hast thou O *man* “ that thou didst not receive?” Again, p. 82, “ to “ arise and go to *their* father.” And p. 83, “ eter- “ nal life as *his* gift thro’ Jesus Christ our Lord.” Now, if in these passages, which stand in your sermons marked with double commas, there is some word (or words) of your own; or some of the terms are so varied or altered by you, that they are not *word for word* as they stand in the holy scriptures, must you not according to your rule, be branded as guilty of *wilful falsehood, villany, knavery, forgery, &c?* If a writer may put one word of his own into a pretended quotation, or may alter one term without be-

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ing guilty of *falshood* or *forgery*, I don't know but he may two or three or more.

But let us in the next place try by this rule, some passages in the New Testament, which the inspired writers introduce as quotations from the *old*, in a most formal manner, *viz.* James iv. 5, “do ye think ‘ that the scripture *saith* in vain, “ *the spirit that dwelleth in us lusteth to envy?*” Now where shall we find this entire sentence, *word for word* in the Old Testament? It is not enough, according to this rule, to find the same *truth* or *doctrine* expressed in other words; but if we can't find it in these *very words*, or *word for word*, the sacred writer must be branded with *falshood*! Again, Gal. iii. 10, ‘ *as it is written*, “ cursed is every one that continueth not in all things written in the book of the law to do them:” But where is this found thus *written word for word* in the Old Testament? it is true you may find the same thing expressed in divers places, as Deut. xxviii. 26, Jerem. xi. 3, but not in the same words, or *word for word*. Likewise, in Matth. iv. 4, Christ says, ‘ *It is written*, “ man *shall not* live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God.” Luke has it thus, ‘ *It is written*, “ man *shall not* live by bread alone, *but by every word of God.*” But in Deut. viii. 3, it stands thus, “ that man *doth not* live by bread only, but by eve-

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“ ry word that ptoceedeth out of the mouth of the  
 “ LORD doth man live.” This quotation is neither  
*word for word*, nor *tense for tense*, as it stands in the  
 Old Testament. What a deal of help would your  
 rule of falshood forgery &c. have afforded the de-  
 vil against Christ, had he a thought of it, for it  
 seems he did not think of this device! and what  
 would the inspired writers of the New Testament  
 have done, if they had been charged with *lying*,  
*forgery*, *falshood*, &c. because in their quotations,  
 they have not wrote every passage *word for word* as  
 it stands in the Old Testament.

*Obj.* But they made use of the *septuagint* or *Greek*  
 translation: *Afw.* But are all their quotations *word*  
*for word*, as they stand in the Greek translation? if  
 so, how comes it to pass, that the same text quot-  
 ed at different times, or by different persons, is not  
 exactly alike word for word? I shall give but one  
 instance out of several, *viz.* Matth. xiii. 14, 15,  
 John, xii. 40, Acts, xxviii. 26, 27, all these are a  
 quotation from *Isaiab*, vi. 9, 10, but they are not  
 alike *word for word*.\* In *Matthew*, the words stand

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thus;

\* These words of the prophet, are not less than five times found  
 in the New Testament, (besides by *Matthew* in these verses) app-  
 plied to the *Jews*, they are taken out of *Isaiab*, chap vi. 9 10,  
 where they are found thus : *and he said, go and tell this people, bear*

you

thus, " by hearing ye shall hear and shall not understand; and seeing ye shall see and shall not perceive, for this people's heart is waxed gross, and their ears are dull of hearing, and their eyes they have closed; lest at any time, they should see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their heart, and should be converted, and I should heal them." But in *Jobn* thus, " He bath blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart; that they should not see with their eyes, nor understand with their heart, and be converted, and I should heal them." Here you see the same text inserted as a quotation by these two writers, is not *word for word* alike\*. However the objection implies, that the *septuagint* translation, is not *word for word* like the *original*, yet Christ, the evangelists

you indeed, &c. It is quoted *Mark* iv. 12, *Luke* viii. 10, where the sense of the words only is quoted more shortly; *John* xii. 40 *Acts* xxviii 26, *Rom.* xi. 2, more largely yet, with some more difference of phrase from that of the prophet.

POOL'S ANNOT. ON *Matth.* 13. 14, 15.

\* Christ's parable of the sower with his explanation of it, is related by three evangelists, viz. by *Matthew*, in chap. xiii. by *Mark*, chap. iv. and by *Luke*, chap. viii. but not in the very same words: they all say the parable and explanation were spoken by Christ; yet their relations are not just alike word for word: now, must such of them be guilty of *falsehood*, whose relation is not in these very words, which Christ used? if so, the doctor will do well to tell which of them is to be cleared, as having related this matter in the very words of Christ.

vangelists and apostles quoted from it, not as a *libel*, but as the written word of God.

Again, speaking in reference to this long passage extracted out of my *essay*, and which you term, “one of the most *impudent, barefaced and execrable pieces of forgery*,” you say, “not a single *complete sentence* is mine; you have indeed, taken two or three scraps of sentences *here and there*, at many pages distance, &c. and yet you know in your own conscience, if you have any, that this is a piece of *right down forgery*; that not one *entire sentence* of all this *gallimaufrey or hotch-potch* is mine.” From which, I suppose, we are to draw this conclusion, *viz. that if a writer shall collect divers sentences out of an author, here and there at many pages distance, and put them together in form; yet if not one entire or complete sentence is in the very words of the author, or word for word; such a thing must be deemed a piece of the most impudent, barefaced, execrable and right down forgery; especially, if the writer represents the author, (from whom he collects) as the speaker, thro’ the whole passage put together in form.*

Let us try by this rule, a passage in *Job*, xxxiii. 8--11, *Elihu* is speaking of *Job*, says he, ‘Surely thou hast spoken in my hearing, and I have heard the voice of thy words, saying, “I am clean with-  
“ out

“ out transgression; neither is their iniquity in me :  
 “ behold he findeth occasions against me; he coun-  
 “ teth me for his enemy: he putteth my feet in  
 “ the stocks; he marketh all my paths.” Now,  
 Sir, if you can’t find all this standing together in  
 form in any of *Job’s* speeches, but must look into di-  
 vers of them, spoken at different times, it may be  
 at many days distance, to find the bones and sinews  
 of it; and yet cannot find scarcely one entire or  
 compleat sentence *word for word* as represented by  
*Elihu*, who introduces this passage in the most for-  
 mal manner as spoken by *Job*; will you call it a *right*  
*down impudent, barefaced, and execrable piece of forge-*  
*ry?* if your rule be good, you must!---and if you  
 please, you may try by the same rule, what the a-  
 postle has collected, in Rom. iii. 10---18, saying, ‘ *as*  
 ‘ *it is written,* “ there is none righteous, no not one;  
 “ there is none that understandeth, there is none  
 “ that seeketh after God; they are all gone out of  
 “ the way; they are together become unprofitable;  
 “ there is none that doth good, no not one: their  
 “ throat is an open sepulchre, &c. &c. &c.” Now,  
 Sir, will you say, that the apostle has pretended to  
 cite from the Old Testament, in a most formal man-  
 ner, a long passage containing eight or nine verses,  
 scarce a single compleat verse of which is to be found  
*verbatim* in the Old Testament; that he has indeed,  
 taken several scraps of verses here and there at ma-  
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ny pages distance, put all in such an order as best suited his design, and palmed the whole upon the world as a quotation, *word for word* from the Old Testament? will you call this of the apostle a piece of right down forgery?

But I can assure you doctor, I did not pretend to cite that long passage from you; nor did I intend my readers should believe I had extracted it from your sermons *word for word*; neither can you prove what you have asserted with such an air of assurance, tho' you assert, proof is not wanting in the present case: the truth is this, I had quoted divers passages from your sermons, *word for word*, as they stand in your sermons; and had spoken to them severally, as I quoted them: but here I brought them together in a *paraphrase* to shew your consistency, or rather inconsistency, as I plainly intimate in the introduction of this long passage; and common readers, with proper attention, must take it in this light, and thus I understand they do take it, so far as I have heard.

But you say, “do not your knees smite one against the other, when you reflect on your own falsehood and villany, particularly in the pretended long citation from me!” but what is the evidence that demonstrates it to be a pretended citation from you? this must be considered.

And !

And first, "it stands marked with double commas." But if this demonstrates it, it must be in some such way as this, viz. whatsoever is marked in any author with double commas, is a *pretended citation word for word* from some other author; and if it is not an exact quotation, when it is thus marked, the author is guilty of *falshood* and villany; but this long passage is so marked (in my *essay*) therefore it is a *pretended citation word for word*: but as it can no where be found word for word in the sermons referred to, I must therefore be judged guilty of *falshood* and villany. *Negatur major*---I deny the major or first proposition thus, viz. whatsoever is marked with double commas is *not* a pretended citation or quotation word for word from another, if a paraphrase or comment on any word or passage is frequently marked with double commas; but the latter is true, *ergo*---just so, you Sir, mark what you call a paraphrase in your sermons, p. 38, 39. You paraphrase for another on your text thus, viz. "the Lord is good to three  
 "quarters of his creatures, and his tender mercies  
 "are over three quarters of his works: but to the  
 "other quarter he is not good, kind or merciful;  
 "but leaves them to unavoidable misery and destruc-  
 "tion.."<sup>70</sup> This you call a paraphrase, and it stands exactly thus marked in your sermons; and the other paraphrase in the next page is, also just so marked by you: I perceive it is common for you to mark a quo-  
 tation

*ation* and a *paraphrase* just alike : in your sermons you mark both with double commas, but in your letter, particularly p. 18, 19, 20, you mark both with a single comma. The result must be this, viz. that what is common both to a quotation and a paraphrase, can be no distinguishing characteristic of a quotation from a paraphrase ; and therefore can afford no evidence to demonstrate a passage to be a *pretended quotation*, what then is become of your undoubted proof, that the passage you swell so at, is a pretended citation from you ?

But secondly, you say, “ it is introduced in a most formal manner as a quotation from me, with these words preceding, SAYS HE.” To which I say, that if this passage *thus marked*, is fully demonstrated to be a *pretended quotation*, because it is introduced with these words preceding, *says he*, then whenever we find a passage *so marked*, and *another person* is introduced as speaking the same, we must take it as full demonstration, that such a passage is a *pretended quotation* in the very words of him, that is represented as the speaker :-----well, in your sermons, p. 37, 38, you represent another person as speaking,--- and mark the words with double commas : the passages I refer to are these, viz. “ half indeed is too many, and shocks the mind at once.”---I understand you well, say you : again, “ no, it sounds  
M “ harshly

“harshly, and seems too much to limit the divine  
 “goodness.” Now, as you mark these passages  
 with double commas, and another person is repre-  
 sented as speaking them, will you allow it to be full  
 demonstration, that they are *pretended quotations*? or  
 that you intended, your readers should believe, you  
 had extracted them word for word out of some au-  
 thor? when a passage is represented as spoken by  
 another person, I humbly conceive it makes no odds  
 whether it is introduced with these words preceding,  
*says he, q. d.\** or not: However Dr. *Watts*, as may  
 be seen in his sermons in a variety of places, intro-  
 duces passages marked with double commas, with  
 these words preceding, *says he, or he says*; and yet  
 it is certain he does not intend such passages as quo-  
 tations word for word from any author. See his book  
 of 44 sermons, two volumes bound together, in p.  
 31, a Christian is introduced as speaking thus, I have  
 “(says he) in my understanding, many arguments  
 “and evidences of the truth of the gospel, and my  
 “reason is convinced that it is a divine religion:  
 “but there is a miracle wrought in my heart, that  
 “is of more efficacy than this, and is to me a more  
 “convincing proof of the gospel of Christ; eternal  
 “life is begun in me, &c.” In p. 44, 45, he repre-  
 sents

\* Tho', it is true, I did intend (*q. d.*) instead of (*says he*) and  
 tho't it was an error of the press, when I first read the printed  
 copy.

sents what saints say in heaven. " I feel now (says  
 " every saint there) that this was a true gospel I  
 " trusted in, in the days of my flesh; and this reli-  
 " gion was divine,, for it hath raised me to these  
 " mansions of blessedness, &c." See also p. 78, 79,  
 80, 82, 83, 91, and in divers other places. Now,  
 as I had two doctors of divinity before me, (and  
 more I can produce) setting me an example how to  
 mark a *paraphrase* or a *representation*, wherein another  
 person is set forth as the speaker, why mayn't I safely  
 throwd myself under these, from the heavy charge of  
*right down, impudent, barefaced and execrable forgery,*  
*falshood and villany?* and if my knees must smite one a-  
 gainst the other, for marking a paraphrase with double  
 commas, &c. why mustn't yours for setting me an  
 example! But however this be, if you can reflect on  
 the many and superabundant charges of *falshood, &c.*  
 grounded on no better evidence than you have ex-  
 hibited, without having your knees smite one a-  
 gainst the other, it may be doubted whether there  
 is any conscience, or even sense of honor remain-  
 ing with you! Tho' your design might be to black-  
 en my moral character, yet it is certain, in the esteem  
 of some of the best judges, you have discovered,  
 neither the scholar, the gentleman, nor the Christian  
 divine!

It seems. you set out with an intention not to  
 reason; but would it not have been much more for

your reputation, to have made some use of reason, instead of spending so much of your time and labour, in reporting the *suppositions* and *opinions*, the *hear-says* and title tattle, that you could pick up about me, my book, &c. which fill up several pages of your letter? tho' chaff may lead silly birds into a snare, and children may be diverted with a wrattle; yet men of sense, of conscience and sound judgment, must have something else to sway their minds, in a matter of such solemn importance, as the absolute necessity of the atonement of Christ in order to forgiveness of sin, consistently with the moral rectitude of God? for if all these *suppositions* and *hear-says* &c. were true, they don't in the least invalidate the argument produced, which you should have considered; nor shew that you were not *inacurate* and *inconsistent*, as you were represented. But as to those *suppositions*, *opinions*, *hear says*, &c. tho' I could easily shew, as to divers of them, that they have not the least foundation in truth; I shall not spend time to do it, nor so much as to repeat them over.

And what you say (p. 44, 45) of the reverend gentleman in *Boston*, who corrected the press for me, instead of discovering the Christian gentleman in you, proclaims to the world what a spleen you have against such Calvinistic divines, as have *signalized their zeal* (to use your words,) against *Arminianism*: and tho'

tho' you say, "but that even this *warm* gentleman  
 "is now no advocate for your libel, or the most *di-*  
 "*stinguishing principles of it*, I can assure you upon  
 "good grounds," yet the manner in which you treat  
 this reverend gentleman, gives grounds to scruple  
 the truth of your assertion: for if he had been so  
 shocked at *my unfairness*, by perceiving how grossly  
 I had *misrepresented* and *falsified* your sermons, (as you  
 intimate) as to turn against the *most distinguishing*  
*principles of my essay*, (as your words imply) which  
 are the most distinguishing principles of the prote-  
 stant reformed system of Christianity; you would  
 likely have said nothing of him, but what would  
 have discovered respect; for the same day *Pilate* and  
*Herod* were made friends together, in which they  
 were united against Christ! but your after saying of  
 him, "who has such a thirst for orthodox blood! (I don't  
 "mean literally,") strongly intimates, that you and  
 he are not yet united in the object of your thirst;  
 I mean principles of religion: that he has yet a thirst  
 for orthodox blood, from which you have an aver-  
 sion: but I can assure you, doctor, upon good grounds,  
 that he is still an advocate for the most distinguishing  
 principles of my *essay*.

I can truly say, it was not any disaffection to your  
 person, that moved me to undertake a defence of  
 some of the most important principles of Christiani-  
 ty,

ty, against your sermons; but love to the truth and the souls of men, and a desire of your good; and I hoped, if you had not Christian humility enough to receive the truth by me, that you had of the reasonable gentleman, not to reject it, because it was wrote by me: and if you have any regard to your own reputation as a minister of the gospel, I can't think, when you come seriously to reflect on the violent thrusts made at my moral character, in such a public manner, that you will need to be called upon to make me public and Christian satisfaction.

And now, as in the closing of your letter, you took on you the part of a friend in giving me your advice, let me entreat you to be so good, as to take a word of advice from me: We both profess to be ministers of the gospel, and have the charge of souls, and must watch for them, as they that must give an account. Now I advise you, when in your closet before the eye of him that sees in secret, to examine, whether you have not in a manner not becoming a gospel minister, judged and set at nought thy brother? also, that you would compare the spirit of your letter and the spirit of the gospel together; for if you don't like and favour the most distinguishing and soul humbling doctrines of the gospel, you can't dislike the *meek, humble, and gentle* spirit of the gospel, while you are in the exercise of human reason: and pray put the case,  
that



that if a heathen or an infidel were to read both the gospel and your letter, whether he could in reason conclude yours to be wrote under the influence of the spirit of the gospel? I advise you to pray much for a humble spirit, for better is the humble in spirit than the proud in spirit. The more truly humble you are, the better you will feel, when you meet with what crosses corrupt nature: and besides, God dwelleth with the humble, to revive their spirit, while the proud he beholds afar off: and the more you are clothed with the spirit of true humility, the more you will act in character as a gospel minister: moreover, there is this advantage, God giveth more grace, he giveth grace to the humble, the meek he will guide in judgment, the meek he will teach *bis way*: but as to your letter, I don't think you can say, it is the language of the humble spirit of the gospel.

Now, if any desire to know why this reply was not exhibited to public view sooner? they must take this for an answer, viz. that there has been such a marvellous work of God's grace agoing on amongst us, in the conviction and hopeful conversion of sinners, that for many months I had not time to turn my thoughts towards forming a reply; for we had work enough to employ many ministers, and indeed many were so kind as to come to our assistance: we had two publick lectures a-week thro' the winter season