# CONTENTS OF VOLUME IV.

## No. I.

## No. II.

## No. III.

## No. IV.

we do say, that the position which they and others like them take on this subject, is most disastrous to the Bible. If they could carry men's convictions with them when they argue that the Bible sanctions American slavery—we say *American* slavery, for that is what we mean and they mean—they would be doing more than is done by perhaps any other agency, to bring the Bible into contempt, and to cause the name of Christ to be blasphemed. They bring the Bible into open conflict, with truths as obvious and as certainly known, as the *very premises on which all proof of the divine origin of the Bible must rest.* These reviewers, in the article often quoted by Mr. B., use the following language. "Every one must feel that if perjury, murder, or idolatry had been thus authorized, it would bring the Mosaic institutions into conflict with the eternal principles of morals, and that our faith in the divine origin of the one or the other must be given up." We turn this language upon them. We try them by their own rule. We say, *they* bring the *Bible* "*into conflict with the eternal principles of morals.*" They affirm that American slavery—a system clearly, palpably, contradicting the first principles of right—is sanctioned by the Bible. Nay, they say that it is vain for any one who denies this, "to *profess* reverence for the Bible." Thus they bring the Bible "into conflict with the eternal principles of morals;" and, by their own rule, their "faith in the divine origin of the one or the other must be given up;" i. e. they must believe that the *Bible is not from God*, or that *God is immoral*—unworthy of love or service. On their own principle, they are *logically* bound to be either infidels or atheists. They are thus giving to the world, and inculcating on the church, premises, which, by a short and logical process, make men, if they will but take the premises, infidels or atheists. The reasoning is just. The logic is infallible. *If* the Bible sanctions this slavery, then it is not from God, or God is without benevolence, and without rightful authority. To say that God sanctions slavery, is, not in intent, but in word and in fact, *blasphemy.* For how could He be more emphatically called the patron of injustice and tyranny, than by saying that he sanctions such a complication of wrongs, such a concentration of oppressions, as American slavery. We implore our brethren, for the sake of God, and for the credit and safety of Christianity, to reconsider and change their position. And we hope that our Princeton brethren, if in all other cases they adhere to their rule to make no progress in ethics or theology, will make an exception here.

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## HOPKINS' LECTURES BEFORE THE LOWELL INSTITUTE.*

The founder of the Lowell Institute realized two objects by his munificent benefaction. He secured to himself a memorial more enduring than the massive granite structure at Mount Auburn, on which his name is inscribed. He has also appropriated to himself the honor of setting up a pillar, to mark a new step forward in the progress of the race. Plato never dreamed, nor did Cicero ever imagine; Mackintosh and Brougham never were so san-

* Lectures on the evidences of Christianity, before the Lowell Institute, January, 1844; by Mark Hopkins, D. D., President of Williams College. 8vo. pp. 383. Boston: T. R. Marvin, 1846.

guine as to expect such a thing, as Mr. Lowell has done. It marks a new era in the history of man, that a wealthy citizen should leave a princely provision, for the perpetual instruction of all the citizens of Boston in so many branches of human knowledge. It indicates greater wisdom and larger views than are usual in such cases, that he did not confine this provision to lectures on the physical sciences, but provided also for courses of instruction on moral philosophy and the evidences of Christianity.

When Prest. Hopkins was selected to deliver the course for 1844, on the evidences of Christianity, his friends anticipated a high measure of success. The lectures, when delivered, were even more satisfactory and popular, than his friends had anticipated. Their influence was thought to be in the highest degree salutary. It is to the very great favor with which they were received, that we owe the publication of them, in this very beautiful volume.

No man could desire a nobler field of effort, or a more inviting opportunity for honorable usefulness, than to be summoned, as he was, to speak to his fellow-men, on such themes; not as a preacher, but as a fellow-inquirer and philosophical teacher; not in the technics of the theologian, but in the language common to all thinking men. It is true, it was a position attended with grave difficulties and serious embarrassments. The lecturer was precluded, if not by the conditions of the service, at least by the no less imperative courtesies of his position, from assuming an attitude which his hearers would consider controversial. To defend Christianity, it is necessary to define Christianity; and to take for granted or to prove, that this or that constitutes a proof of Christianity. Unhappily, there is no place, where so much diversity of opinion is known to exist among the leading circles, concerning what Christianity is, and what is required to prove it divine, as there is in Boston. These difficulties were not diminished by the circumstance, that Prest. Hopkins chose to give the greatest prominence to the internal evidence, and thus was obliged to go a certain length in ascertaining what Christianity is?

No man who reads this book and understands these circumstances, can avoid concluding, that the thing to be done was very adroitly done; that the lecturer could hardly have been more successful in being true to his own convictions, without offending those of some of his audience.

These lectures are written in Dr. Hopkins' usual felicitous manner. The style is easy and flowing, and is not too diffuse for a popular audience. It is the opposite of the stately and measured. It falls in naturally with the humor of the writer, and obeys the demands of the subject with a pleasant gracefulness. It puts the speaker on familiar terms with his audience, and makes them quite easy in listening to him. At times it may be, and is, negligent, and even slip-shod; at times too, it is disfigured by what John Randolph called, on a notable occasion—"a little too frequent use of the pronoun I, for a modest man;" but on the whole, there are few writers whom for style, it is more pleasant to hear or read. But the great charm of Dr. Hopkins, and his power over the public mind, lie in the pertinency and point of his illustrations. They are always his own, and they are always to the purpose. There is also in his eloquent passages, a fine glow—a noble warmth and elevation of sentiment, which, though it never takes the strongest hold upon you, never fails to move you really, and to move you in the right direction.

The work consists of twelve lectures. Of these, the first two and a part of the third are preliminary, on which we propose to offer a remark or two. Till the ninth he is occupied with the internal evidences. The last four are devoted to the external evidences and the conclusion.

The lectures from the third to the ninth, are by far the ablest and most interesting. They give to the volume its chief value. They treat of the internal evidences, which the author rightly judged, would be the most intelligible and forcible to a miscellaneous audience. Those selected are the following. The analogy of the Christian religion to the works and natural government of God. The coincidence of Christianity with natural religion. The adaptation of Christianity to the nature of man, under the several heads of conscience, the intellect, the affections, the imagination, and the will. Christianity as a restraining power. The experimental evidence of Christianity. Its fitness to become universal. Christianity could not have been originated by man. The condition, character and claims of Christ. These topics when summed up, might be described as follows: Christianity vindicated as an ethical and religious system, and its principles and its author shown to have come from God. The higher and the commanding proof, derived from the fact that it finds man a sinner under condemnation, and provides for him a justifying and sanctifying Redeemer, was forbidden ground to the author. This is the argument prosecuted by the Apostle in the epistle to the Romans, and is in our view, *the* ground of all others, which convinces the intellect and holds the conscience of man.

In prosecuting the argument on the grounds just named, the author does not assume the attitude of repelling objections, so much as that of asserting truth. He expressly disclaims the position, of "defending Christianity as if its truth were a matter of doubt;" but employs himself in uncovering and spreading out the considerations, on which its divinity rests. This he does in these chapters—ably, eloquently, and not unfrequently with freshness and force. The effect on the majority of his audience, must have been to deepen their convictions of the divine origin of the Christian system, as well as to exalt their views of its moral dignity, and to impress them strongly with a sense of the obligations of the race to the spirit and the teachings of its author.

We could have wished, indeed, that there had been more exactness of thought, and a more just and thorough appreciation of the difficulties and the objections of the skeptic, and a more vigorous and commanding force of argument. We would not have had these lectures, in one iota, less adapted to the popular mind. We would not have had them more metaphysical, nor more technical, nor more controversial, nor less illustrative than they are. But a richer metal may have as fine an efflorescence as one that is alloyed, and a strong, even the strongest course of thought, the most entire mastery of the objections of the philosophical skeptic, and a thorough familiarity with all the reading connected with the defences of Christianity, would only fit a man more effectually to preclude all objections without raising them, and to set forth the positive grounds of the Christian faith with greater simplicity and more convincing force to the humblest mind.

The external evidences of Christianity are considered in three lectures, with but little taste on the part of the author for this branch of the subject, and with a positive disclaimer of research or originality. It is to us a matter of regret, that he did not at least fuse his materials together, and cast them anew. For however ill-suited they may be to the taste of a lecturer or his hearers, there is no work more important than that of recasting the whole historical argument, and the working it up with force and point and freshness, so that it shall take hold of the mind.

The concluding lecture is beautiful, eloquent and felicitous. We give an extract, not because it is superior to many other passages, but as giving a fair specimen of the work.

"Certainly no revolution that has ever taken place in society, can be compared to that which has been produced by the words of Jesus Christ. Those words met a want, a deep want, in the spirit of man. They placed in the clear sunlight of truth a solution of those profound problems and enigmas, in relation to man and his destiny, about which the philosophers only disputed. They more than confirmed every timid hope, which the wisest and best of men had cherished. He pointed men to a Father in Heaven—to the mansions of rest which He would prepare. He "brought life and immortality to light." He erected a perfect standard of morals, and insisted upon love to God and love to man, and he stood before men in the glorious light of his own perfect example. He spoke, and that spiritual slumber of the race which seemed the image of death, was broken up; and a movement commenced in the moral elements, that has not ceased from that day to this, and that never will cease. Those who were mourning heard his voice and were comforted; those who were weary and heavy-laden, heard it and found rest unto their souls. * * * Before it, the heathen oracles were dumb, and the fires upon the altars went out. It acted as an invisible and secret force on society, communing with men upon their beds by night, dissuading them from wickedness, seconding the voice of conscience, giving both distinctness and energy to its tones, now whispering and now speaking, with a voice that made the stoutest tremble, of righteousness, temperance and of a judgment to come. It opened Heaven, and spoke to the ear of hope. It uncovered that world, "where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched." It was stern in its rebuke of every sin, and encouraged every thing that was "pure and lovely and of good report." Being addressed to man universally, without regard to his condition or his nation, it paid little regard to differences of language, or habits, or the boundaries of states. Persecution was aroused; it kindled its fires, it brought forth its wild beasts. Blood flowed like water, but the blood of the martyrs was the seed of the church. No external force could avail against a power like this. The word was spoken, and it could not be recalled. The hand of God had made a new adjustment in the movement of the moral world, and the hand of man could not put it back. No other revolution has ever been so extensive or so radical. Moving on directly to the accomplishment of its own more immediate and higher objects, the voice of Christ has incidentally caused, not only moral, but social and civil revolutions. It has banished idolatry and polytheism, with their inseparable degradations, and pollutions, and cruelty. Human sacrifices, offered by our own ancestors, by the Greeks, and Romans, and Carthagenians, and the ancient worshippers of Baal and Moloch—offered now in the islands of the Pacific and in India and in Africa—cease at once where Christianity comes. It was before its light had visited this continent, that seventy five thousand human beings were sacrificed at the consecration of a single temple. It has banished the ancient games, in which men slew each other and were exposed to the fury of wild beasts, for the amusement of the people. It has banished slavery, once so prevalent, from Europe and from a large portion of this continent. * * These and such as these are the public, visible and undeniable, effects of Christianity uniformly produced in any community, in proportion as a pure Christianity prevails. To me, however, these are rather indications of a great work than the work itself. They are but as the coral reef that appears above the surface, which is as nothing to the deep and concealed labors of the little ocean architect. * * * When I see the earth covered with vegetation—when I see a vast forest standing and clothed with the green robes of summer—I know there must have been an amazing amount of elemental action. I think how the atmosphere, and the light, and the moisture, and the earth, must have conspired together, and how the principle of vegetable life must have lifted up the mass, particle by particle, till at length it has formed the sturdy trunk, and set his "coronal" of green leaves upon the monarch of the forest. And so when I see these results, these institutions, standing in their freshness and greenness—when I see the moral desert budding and blossoming—I know these must have been the play of moral life, the clear shining of truth, the movement of the spirit of God, and the deep, though it may be, silent strugglings of the spirit of man."—*Lecture XII, pp.* 373–378.

In reading the preliminary chapters, some two or three points occurred to us, as worthy a remark.

The first, respects the nature of the evidence on which Christianity is to be received. After conceding that it is moral evidence, as opposed to mathematical, the writer asks: "Is, then, mathematical evidence a better ground of certainty than moral evidence? On this point, and also respecting the subjects to which mathematical evidence can properly be applied, there is a wrong impression extensively prevalent, not only in the community at large, but among educated men." The suggestion, that mathematical evidence can never be applied to establish truth of fact, whether philosophical or historical, is just and in place. But so also the argument, that in its own sphere moral evidence is as good, and even better, ground of *confidence* or *faith*, than is mathematical *certainty*, and that this is just the kind of evidence which we should expect in the case of a moral system such as the Christian, would have been appropriate, and might have been urged with great force, in connection with the author's favorite line of argument. We marvel, that it should have been omitted altogether, and with it the assertion of the principle, that this is the evidence, and the only evidence, which we should look for in a system designed to test the honesty of those to whom it comes, and "to be a sign for the rising and falling of many in Israel." But we wonder still more, that Dr. Hopkins should have ventured such remarks, as that in mixed mathematics, the certainty of the surveyor in his conclusion, must depend on the supposition that he had run the lines and taken the angles correctly; or that in pure mathematics, the certainty that the hypothetical premises involve the conclusion, depends on the presupposition of which we never can be absolutely confident, that we did not lose our memory in passing from one step of the demonstration to another. It seems to us to depend on this, no more than it does on the fact that we have not fallen asleep during the process, or that we are not insane, or that we retain our personal identity. We wonder still more, that having ventured this once, he should deliberately say it again, in the words: "and what shall we say of the boasted superiority of mathematical evidence, when the certainty which any man feels even for such a hypothetical conclusion as can be demonstrated, is, after all, dependent upon evidence that is not mathematical?" This argument might have occurred to the author as an ingenious suggestion, and through his fondness for the fancy, might have failed to be scanned; or it might have seemed to serve well a purpose, by which to meet the objection of a clerk in Washington street, whose standard of truth is his yard-stick, or of the man on change, whose Bible is his Ledger; but we should like to see the educated men, on whose minds such a "wrong impression" had rested so as to demand such an argument, or with whose minds the argument would have been held as valid.

We come next to the consideration of Hume's argument against the credibility of miracles, of which the author thus speaks: "Shall I then go on to state and answer that argument? I am not unwilling to do so, because it will, I presume, be expected; and because it is still the custom of those who defend Christianity to do so, just as it was the custom of British ships to fire a gun on passing the port of Copenhagen, long after its power had been prostrated, and its influence had ceased to be felt." This illustration is a pleasant one, and with the author's view of the thing to be illustrated, is very happy. It would not be so happy, however, if it should prove that his estimate of the position of the antagonist should be seen to be underrated, and the charge of his gun should prove to have been prepared under this impression. Nothing in our view can be more untrue, than that the power of this argument has "been prostrated, and its influence has ceased to be felt." Hume's argument is *the* argument, which is the very back-bone of the current infidelity, both vulgar and refined, both unlearned and philosophical. You can not hear a low scoffer attempt to argue, who does not, in fact, advance it, even if he does not in form. And certainly the Rationalism of the present day—whose influence, we have heard, is not unfelt at Boston—rests upon it, as on its strong and almost its only ground. Whether unacknowledged or confessed, it is always proceeded upon.

In meeting this argument, Dr. Hopkins observes, "that Hume takes it for granted, that what we call a miracle is contrary to the uniformity of nature. Indeed, his own definition of a miracle is, that it is a violation of the laws of nature. But how can we know that what we call a miracle is not, in the highest and most proper sense, as natural as any other work? By the term natural, we mean stated, fixed, uniform. Whatever happens statedly, under given circumstances, is natural. In accordance with this definition, we call an event natural, though it happen but once in a thousand years, provided it come round statedly at the end of that time. But who can tell whether in the vast cycles of God's moral Government, miracles may not have been provided for, and come in, at certain distant points, as statedly and uniformly, and therefore as naturally, as any thing else?" &c. This argument has become not uncommon of late, with writers of a certain class. We confess we do not see its force. We can not understand its drift. If it be put in good faith, as an expression of the real opinion of him who gives it as an answer, it is exposed to the very strong objection, that it countenances that reverence for the laws of nature, which, as Dr. Hopkins says, the opponents of Hume have so often conceded. "They permitted him, while arguing the question ostensibly on the ground of theism, to involve positions that are really atheistic. They have permitted him to give surreptitiously, to the mere physical laws of nature, a sacredness and permanence, which put them in the place of God." What can tend to do this more effectually, than the justification of miracles on the ground, that they may be, for aught that we know, stated, uniform, and natural? This, however, is not the most serious objection to this argument. The whole value and force of a miracle, as giving credit to the man who works it, or the truth for which it is wrought, lies in the fact, that it is not "stated," nor "uniform," nor "natural," but that for a specific object—the *causa causarum* can and does suspend the operation of his stated and uniform and natural way of action, in order to attest his sanction of a truth or a messenger. There is no need that provision should have been made beforehand, by interlocking into the machinery of the natural universe, an extra and accidental wheel, that should have been contrived from eternity to come in just at this critical moment, and yet revolve regularly and uniformly, only so as always to happen just when a miracle is needed. Not only is there no need of this contrivance, but the very suggestion of it destroys the force and interpretation which men put upon a miracle when wrought. If a friend of ours were raised from a sick bed, or called up from the sleep and corruption of death, and we were to say and to feel this is the direct agency of God, and to interpret its moral significance; and if just at this moment a philosopher should suggest, that it was occasioned by some law of the vital fluid, or some mysterious animal magnetism, which happened, in all regularity, to be present then, and effected this result; it would destroy the significance of the miracle, in spite of ourselves and of him. It is *the* ground also, which the *anti-supernaturalism* of the age rests upon. Its argument is, a miracle is a wonder. Whatever is a wonder to the eye of the observer, produces the effect of a miracle. Christ and his disciples wrought miracles, by their knowledge of laws which were hid from the knowledge of those ages, but which were natural and fixed notwithstanding. The suggestion of this, as an interpretation of the past, destroys the significance of the act, and robs it of its power to attest to us the truth of God. We feel that if this is so, there was a pious jugglery unworthy of God; a jugglery in *his deeds* which destroys our confidence in his *words*. It makes no difference, that in the one case the miracle worker knew the law of which to avail himself, and in the other both the worker and the spectators were ignorant of both, except that in the one case it is God, and in the other it is his messenger that imposes on us. The same impression is produced by such an argument as this of Dr. Hopkins, though for other reasons not in the same degree, as is wrought by the explanations of the miracles of Christ in Paulus, or Furness' Life of Jesus. In this last book, the argument most frequent, is, that the sick were healed by the naturally curative power of faith, excited by the virtuous life and confident manner of Jesus.

We ought to say here, that Dr. Hopkins, in another place, takes precisely the view of the matter which we have done. When he asks, p. 34, "Do we believe in the existence of a personal God, intelligent and free?—not a God who is a part of nature, or a mere personification of the powers of nature, but one who is as distinct from nature as the builder of the house is from the house? Then we can find no difficulty in believing, that such a God may, at any time, when the good of his creatures requires it, change *the mode of his operations and suspend those laws.*" What is a little surprising to us is, that in the illustration designed to exhibit the other view, i. e. that of the possibility of miracles being natural, he in fact abandons the ground, and illustrates the very opposite doctrine. The provision for the reversal of the action of the locomotive, is, in no sense, designed for "stated and uniform and natural" use; nor does it call itself into action, just when this action is needed. It does not hold back the engine by self-adjustment, when the train pushes too hard, down a descending grade; or suddenly hold it up, when a collision is at hand; but it supposes *an engineer* to use it in junctures "neither stated, nor uniform, nor natural." The illustration is fine, and it is a pity it was not put in the right place in the argument.

We are sorry not to see, in Dr. Hopkins' direct consideration of Hume's argument, what we conceive to be the real and the only sufficient answer to that argument. The argument is this—"It is contrary to experience, that the laws of nature should be suspended or reversed. But it is not contrary to experience, that men should be deceived, and utter falsehood. Moreover, it is according to experience, that, in respect to religion, men are prone to be credulous, to be imposed upon and to deceive. When, therefore, a miracle is said to have been performed, we set our experience of the uniformity of nature—against our experience of the fallibility of human testimony, and the former must weigh down the latter; or if it do not in respect to prodigies in nature, it must in respect to prodigies in religion." The true answer to the argument, we think, to be this.

"The argument is good in all ordinary cases; and not only is it sound, but it is the one which mankind unconsciously employ. We use it ourselves, in respect to the miracles of Mahomet, and of Joseph Smith, and of the 'Holy coat of Treves.' But whenever it may be shown, that a miracle is demanded by the nature of the case, and that the doctrine revealed is worthy of the interposition, then not only may a miracle be believed, but not to believe it implies a spirit, not only unphilosophical but wicked. This is the case with the Christian miracles." We are sorry that Dr. Hopkins did not assert and expand this argument. It is at once adapted to a miscellaneous audience, as it commends itself to the conscience and common sense of all thinking men. It is capable of endless expansion and illustration, and is altogether coincident with the favorite line of argument of the lecturer. This would have been a gun worth firing, at a fortress by no means dismantled or nominal; least of all in Boston.

We observe farther, in respect to this argument of Hume's, that it was designed as an explanation of the practical rules of belief or disbelief, in regard to prodigies and miracles, or, in other words, the law of evidence, as employed by thinking men. It does not bear upon its face the finished assertion of ultimate and fundamental principles, in regard to the foundations of our confidence in the uniformity of nature, or in human testimony; but rather the law of actual procedure, for practical judgment, in specific cases. Taken in this view, it is a sound and useful canon, as it seems to us; and although we like not the sneer and heartlessness of the manner, there is great force in Hume's cautions, in respect to miracles, said to be wrought for religion, as especially suspicious.

Had it been answered as it should have been, as a practical canon, rather than made a metaphysical puzzle, it would have been well. Had Hume's opponents conceded the truth of what he said, and then retorted upon him the complex argument, from the nature of the doctrine as worthy of God; as commended to the conscience of man, and as thus enforcing a belief, on the grounds both of our confidence in nature and in testimony; this spectered ghost of an argument would long since have ceased to haunt the dreams of theologians, and to provoke their passes at its metaphysic shadow, which has proved

> "as the air invulnerable,
> And our vain blows malicious mockery."

Had the fortress been thus attacked, it would have long ago been in a worse condition than that of Copenhagen, and would not have required the recognition of its former greatness, by the compliment even of a passing gun.

But this was not done, and for three reasons:—First, the doctrines were discussed metaphysically and not practically. Much learned dust was raised, to show what are the true grounds of our belief in the uniformity of nature; and extreme cases were ingeniously supposed, to prove that we might in some cases withdraw our confidence from her. The force of human testimony was dwelt upon, as being, under certain circumstances never likely to occur, absolutely overwhelming. Whereas, however useful this discussion has been in indirectly casting light on the dark places of metaphysical inquiry, and however potent the ghost of Hume was seen to be, in leading to the invention, as Chalmers says, of two instinctive laws of nature, in order to lay it, the argument was a practical one and ought to have been so considered. Secondly, the friends of Christianity were less used to metaphysics than their adversaries. Then, as now, it was the fashion to decry metaphysics, as useless if not wicked, and so to discourage the study of them; and in the time of need to rush to their aid, and find the ally, which in the time of security had been reproached and scorned, was slow to come to the rescue. Third, the sneer of Hume in the words, "our most holy religion is founded on *Faith*, not on reason, and it is a sure method of exposing it to put it to such a trial as it is by no means fitted to endure," was but too completely justified by the current language of many divines of his day. When they complained of it, he could point them to too many passages in their own writings, to leave them ground for complaint. To rest religion on reason, was then, as now, deemed by many dangerous and profane; and when the scoffer retorted, that there was no occasion for complaint against him for showing that it had no reason on which to rest, for that on their own principles reason was not necessary, he had the better of them for the moment.

It is remarked with great justice by Mill, in a critique on Hume's argument, Logic, pp. 376, 7, Am. Ed., "It is now acknowledged, by nearly all the ablest writers on the subject, that natural religion is the necessary basis of revealed; that the proofs of Christianity presuppose the being and moral attributes of God; and that it is the conformity of a religion to those attributes, which determines whether credence ought to be given to its external evidences; that (as the proposition is sometimes expressed) the doctrine must prove the miracles, not the miracles the doctrine."* After showing that these are the views of the New Testament, he adds, "There is no reason therefore that timid Christians should shrink from accepting the logical canon of the grounds of disbelief. And it is not hazarding much to predict, that a school which peremptorily rejects all evidences of religion, except such as, when relied upon exclusively, the canon in question irreversibly condemns; which denies to mankind the right to judge of religious doctrine, and bids them depend on miracles as their sole guide; must, in the present state of the human mind, inevitably fail, in its attempt to put itself at the head of the religious feelings and convictions of this country," &c.

We had intended to offer strictures on certain other philosophical opinions of this volume, particularly on those expressed, pp. 66—70, on the case of a conflict between conscience and the natural instincts and a miraculous command of God; and upon those, pp. 104—106, on the relation of natural and revealed religion. What we ought to say is hinted at in the remarks we have quoted from Mill, and others made by him in the same connection. Our limits forbid us to occupy more space. We only add, that there are doubtless many readers, who, as well as ourselves, were curious to know what Dr. Hopkins would say upon subjects of so great interest as these. Perhaps there are some who are disappointed and puzzled, that they can not discover more clearly from his words, what he meant to say. Dr. Hopkins owes it both to himself and to the cause of truth, never to seem not to know clearly what he thinks, or to be unwilling to commit himself by an open and distinct avowal of what his opinions are. The fact that good men differ on such points, or that suspicions are cast upon those who hold the views which Dr. Hopkins at times seems

* We suppose the meaning of this last clause to be, that the doctrine must be such as to remove all presumption against the miracles, and thus fully to counteract all opposing evidence from the uniformity of nature's laws, against the divine authority of the teacher; and that thus, while the truth of the doctrine does not, in all cases at least, depend on the miracles, it derives from them, the fuller confirmation of the divine sanction.

to assert, are *the very* reasons why every friend of truth should contribute what is in him, to a final adjustment of the question. Or let a man say nothing.

We observe also, here and there, a dash of Transcendentalism, which is not in good taste. Pres. Hopkins' clear and sparkling thoughts are worth infinitely more than those enveloped in a purple haze, however bright the purple, or glorious the halo that invests them.

But enough of criticism. We should be sorry if our commendations of this book should be compared with our strictures upon it; and the conclusion should be drawn, that the space allotted to each represents our comparative estimate of the two. We commend this book very heartily for its many and peculiar excellencies. We have not seen so able and interesting a work this many a day. Were it to fall into the hands of none but partial or unphilosophical readers, we should commend it altogether, and only commend it. But as this will not be the case, and as the publication of a book that treats of the philosophical grounds of Christianity, is a very grave matter in these days, we have endeavored to discharge the higher duty which we owe to the cause of truth.

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Thompson

## THE PERSECUTIONS AMONG THE ARMENIANS.

The attentive readers of missionary intelligence, especially of that conveyed through the Missionary Herald, will recollect that some fifteen years ago, a mission was commenced by the American Board among the Armenians residing in Constantinople and other cities of the Levant. Rev. H. G. O. Dwight, who in connection with Rev. Eli Smith, of the Syrian Mission, had visited Armenia proper, and the Armenian churches and communities scattered over the east, was appointed to labor among that interesting people in the metropolis of the Turkish empire.

"Armenia is an inland country at the eastern extremity of Asia Minor, lying at short distances from the Mediterranean on the southwest, the Black sea on the northwest, the Caspian on the northeast, and at a much greater distance from the Persian gulf on the southeast. Its western boundary is not far from six hundred miles east of Constantinople."* It adjoins Georgia and the Caucassian possessions to the north, Mesopotamia and Assyria on the south, and Pontus and Cappadocia on the west. In its centre is Mt. Ararat, from which this country has been appropriately called "the second cradle of the human race, whence were scattered over the face of the earth, the first progenitors of every nation."

The Armenians, after various political changes, have at length ceased to exist as a distinct nation. Their country has been divided among their more powerful neighbors. They are scattered in almost every part of Turkey and Persia, and are found also in India, and in Russia. Their number is estimated at about 3,000,000 in the Turkish empire. At least 150,000 are to be found in Constantinople and its suburbs. There are several thousands also at

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* Researches of Smith and Dwight in Armenia. To these volumes we are indebted for many of the facts stated in the following pages. See also Southgate's narrative, the Missionary Herald, and the occasional publications of Mr. Dwight and other missionaries in the Levant.