

THE  
ANTI-JACOBIN  
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For APRIL, 1800.

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“Quantum literarum cultus ac patrocinium, quantum earum ignorantio odiumque ad virtutes aut ad vitia conformant; quicquid ubique gentium consuetudines populorum, instituta nationum, regionum ingenia, ritus, natura præcipiunt aut vetant; tantum *Critico* per-  
vestigandum, tenendum, usurpandum est.” - STRADA.

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ORIGINAL CRITICISM.

ART. I. *Lucretii Cari de rerum Natura, libros Sex, &c.*  
*&c. &c.*

(Continued from p. 258.)

TO discriminate those various systems of the Grecian philosophy, which were studied at Rome in the age of Lucretius, or to particularize the tenets of Epicurus, which are known to have been adopted by our poet, would, here, be an unnecessary task. The doctrines of Epicurus, addressed as they were to the senses and the passions, were more peculiarly alluring. A great majority of the Roman youth (who were yet, unable, it seems, to blend mental with corporeal enjoyment,) had imbibed the instructions of the Grecian voluptuary: and Lucretius, the contemporary of Cicero, and the friend of Atticus, was not less a lover of tranquillity and pleasure in practice than in theory.

Lucretius had been educated at Athens, and had there acquired the language and the philosophy of Greece. The language was copious and accommodating: and the philosophy could scarcely be expressed with full effect in any other tongue. To the Roman tongue, comparatively poor and inflexible, the

that equability of heat and redundancy of moisture, which the farmer and gardener at present so heavily lament.

“Why these westerly winds have ceased to bear the character of zephyrs, is not, perhaps, easy to say; we are not at present possessed of sufficient data whereon to found any well-grounded theory. The following ingenious queries are, however, modestly proposed by Mr. Hamilton.

1. “Have not our winds become more violent, and the temperature of our seasons more equable, since our forests were cleared, and the country cultivated? And have not these winds, and that equability of temperature, been nearly proportioned to these circumstances?”

2. “Have not similar changes occurred under analogous circumstances in North America; even in Canada, that country of extremes in heat and cold; and did not the island of Bermudas, though situated so much to the southward of us, become barren of fruit in consequence of the destruction of its timber trees?”

3. “Has it not appeared from observations on the ascent of balloons, and the motion of clouds, that the lower mass of air often pursues a different course from the upper stratum; May not then the limits of our stormy currents of air, be confined within a few hundred yards of the surface of the earth? And if so, is it not possible, and even probable, that the frequent interruption of forests, groves, and hedge-row trees, might have formerly very much retarded, and finally checked, the progress of a tempest?”

4. “Have not all the countries of Europe, Asia, and America, within the parallel of our island, been very much denuded of their forests within the present century? And has not the increased velocity of the westerly winds, been proportioned to this destruction of the forests and trees?”

5. “Is it not probable, since the prevalent winds of our parallel have a westerly tendency, that circumstances which have removed impediments to their career round the entire globe, may have increased the velocity of their course?”

“Whether so diminutive an animal as man, so temporary in duration, so impotent in strength, acting through the lengthened period and persevering efforts of a large portion of his species, can reasonably be deemed equal to the involuntary production of such vast effects; to a change even of the elements and climates of the earth, may admit of doubt, opposition, and denial; for which reason he has simply proposed them as matters of enquiry.”

*(To be concluded in our next.)*

ART. IV. *Remarks on the First Part of a Book, written by Thomas Paine, entitled “The Age of Reason.”* By Samuel Drew. St. Austell, Cornwall. 1799. Pp. 72. 12mo.

**I**N that impudent assault upon Christianity which was made by Thomas Paine, as the auxiliary of the French Revolution, as the projector of a similar Revolution in Britain, and therefore

therefore the very natural assailant of our loyalty by undermining our religion, many have come forward to defend the *palladium* of the latter, in order to secure it and our whole *Troy* at once. But we recollect not one of these, that was so much upon a level with Paine in education, and in situation, as the present author; a shoemaker of St. Austell, encountering the staymaker of Deal, with the same weapons of un-lettered reason, tempered, indeed, from the armory of God, yet deriving their principal power from the native vigour of the arm that wields them. Samuel Drew, however, is infinitely superior to Thomas Paine, we understand, in the rectitude of his conduct and in the religiousness of his spirit. And he is almost equally superior, we feel, in the justness of his remarks, in the forcibleness of his arguments, and in the pointedness of his refutations. We shall, therefore, dwell more particularly upon this pamphlet than its size or its appearance would naturally suggest, that we may draw it forth from that provincial confinement, to which the modesty of its writer had apparently destined it, and exhibit the writer, as well as the work, to the eye of the public at large.

“A few days since,” says Mr. Drew, “an acquaintance of mine favoured me with the sight of your book, a book which I had often heard of but never read. From the celebrity of its author, and the title it bears, my expectations were greatly raised; and I began to read ‘the Age of Reason’ with a curiosity, which such performances are calculated to inspire. I have investigated with all the candour and attention I was capable of, every observation worthy of notice in the first part of your book. From the little knowledge I had of your abilities, I expected to find in ‘the Age of Reason’ much of that acuteness, which the title of your book gave me reason to expect; but because I will not be guilty of what you call ‘mental lying,’ I will tell you frankly I was disappointed, and will thus declare my sentiments on your book with all that freedom with which the mind of man communicates itself.

“Whether popularity have made you arrogant, or flattery inspired you with conceit, I will not presume to determine; but this I know, you have in many places (for reasons best known to yourself,) substituted ridicule in the room of argument, while epithets have dazzled the mind with a superficial glare, as though your design were to excite contempt, rather than produce conviction. Instead of meeting with demonstrations in every page, I have seen idle declamations calculated rather to delude than inform; I have met with premises of your own creation, which you have assumed and argued conclusively from; while on premises which are just, in many places your arguments are insufficient, your reasonings inconclusive, and your inferences unjust.

“You have blended together in one common mass the heathen

mythology, Mahometanism, Christianity, Popery, Priestcraft, with all the errors and all the vices of every party, all the dissentions and trifling religion have been produced by a departure from the principles of *Deism*; and from this confused and complicated mass of material you have selected every odium, and, with an effrontery hardly to be paralleled, you have thrown the whole on Christian Revelation. Is this fair? you have made comparisons, which are as invidious as they are unjust; and, in those who choose to place more dependence on your tone and scurrility than your proofs, your book is likely to produce those effects which it seems peculiarly calculated for. You seem to have arrogated to yourself the summit of human knowledge, and the exclusive right of rationality; and to tell the world, 'that the barbarism and mental shackles, in which it had been held from time immemorial, have been reserved to be torn away by the superior genius of Thomas Paine;' as though all that have been held sacred by millions of rational beings for thousands of years, among whom have been many of the greatest geniuses that ever adorned human nature, as though all were to receive from your pen a final overthrow in about fifty pages, formed of a composition of just and false reasoning, and declamation enclosed in a large atmosphere of buffoonery and disdain. And, were your book divested of extraneous matter, all that is pertinent to the purpose might be confined in a much narrower compass. With thinking people you have forfeited your reputation, by your irreverent manner of writing; and by inferring, through a mode of reasoning as unaccountable as your principles, from the sources of religion the vices of its professors. Those, and those alone, are likely to be your prey, who, from an inability to investigate your principles, or a disinclination to exert their judgments, make no resistance to your attacks. It is not possible for me to give a complete answer to all you have advanced in your book; there are many things which my small literary acquirements prevent me from examining into. These positions may be true for any thing I know to the contrary, or they may be false for any thing I know of in their favour; but I have been taught by what I know of your book, to suspect your reasonings to be specious but unsound. The triumphant contempt with which you spurn the bible from you, discovers more of the dogmatist than the reasoner.

" Situate in the humble walks of life as I am, my acquaintance with those means which might furnish me with materials for answering your book is but small. I must, therefore, resort to the region of common-sense, where the field of reason is open to all alike. I shall now bid adieu to general reflections, and endeavour to make some remarks on your pages as I pass along."

This prefatory part of the work promises well. Nor are our expectations disappointed in the progress of the work. They are kept up to the close. They are even gratified to the highest extent and beyond it. In order to shew this, we shall lay three or four extracts before our readers.

“ Page 5th, where you define Revelation to be ‘ something immediately communicated from God to man :’ you then add, ‘ It is a contradiction in terms, to call any thing a revelation which comes to us second-handed either verbally or in writing ;’ Revelation is necessarily limited to the first communication.’ It is astonishing to see what a fine genius \* is capable of degenerating to! God, in the nature of things, cannot render himself visible to our bodily organs, without interrupting the course of nature ; nor can it be that matter can discern spiritual and incorporeal essences in the present order of things. Agreeable to this principle we find a correspondence of facts : if you travel through the various systems of the universe, you will find this to be invariably the case. As it is certain that God never has descended, so it is probable that he never can descend in the effulgence of his glory on our feeble powers, without adding a proportionate assistance to our intellects or senses. Every medium, through which God manifests his will to his creatures, must necessarily destroy the immediateness of the communication ; but God has always communicated intelligence through some medium or other ; therefore, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as immediate communication from God in the world. Whatever we know of God, or behold of God, is obtained from him through some medium ; we behold him in the natural, the moral, and in the civil world, discovering himself through mediums : hence, he

‘ Warms in the sun, refreshes in the breeze,

‘ Glows in the stars, and blossoms in the trees ;’

all, all those things are mediums, through which he has manifested, and does manifest, himself to the human race.

“ A communication of God, abstracted from a medium, is not oral or written revelation, but *sensible proof*. Now sensible proof necessarily destroys, by preceding it, the immediateness of such revelation ; and, if its immediateness be destroyed, it must necessarily pass beyond the first communication. That sensible proof is necessarily limited to the first communication I readily admit ; but, with oral or written revelation, the case is quite otherwise. Had the Bible recommended itself to us on the evidence of *sensation*, and yet withheld that evidence on which it rested, your observations would have been just ; viz. ‘ That it is a contradiction in terms to call any thing a *sensation* after the first communication, and that it is necessarily limited to the first communication.’ If a definition of revelation be what you say, (and what I believe,) ‘ a communication of something which we know not before,’ there is no necessity of limiting it to the first nor [or] second communication ; but it may run parallel with that ignorance which its design was to remove.

“ After having in page 5th, necessarily excluded from the ‘ idea of revelation all, who are not within the limits of the first communi-

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\* We object to this compliment from the author to the arguer. It is merely an effusion of over-done civility. *Rev.*

cation; you say (page 12th,) 'Revelation cannot be applied to any thing done upon earth of which man is either the actor or witness.'—Now how any revelation is possible on your principles I know not; for, if it be a 'contradiction to call any thing a revelation after the first communication,' all who are not present must, of necessity, be excluded, and of course none, but such as are within the reach of the first communication, can have any revelation. Next comes page 12th, where you exclude all who are present; 'because nothing can be a revelation of which man is either the actor or witness.' You here completely exclude all who are present; for it is impossible for any thing to be revealed to me, and yet leave me without any knowledge of it, and with my knowledge I am the witness to myself of that revelation; but if my being a witness necessarily destroys revelation to me, and revelation be destroyed in those who are absent, because they are without witness, you leave nobody to whom a revelation is possible. And yet you say in page 5th, 'No one can doubt but God can make such a communication if he please.' How these contradictions are to be reconciled I leave you to determine. Thus, Sir, the different parts of your argument militate against each other, and conspire to overthrow the whole."

This extract will serve to set Mr. Drew in a strong point of view to the public. We see the native vigour of his mind, mounting, in spite of every pressure, from his situation in life, rising up to the level of logical argumentation, and refuting the absurdities of Paine at once, by shewing their contrariety to themselves as well as to common-sense. But we will produce another extract.

"Page 7th, you are displeas'd with the account given of the resurrection and ascension of Jesus Christ, because it wants publicity. Your words are, 'The resurrection and ascension, supposing them to have taken place, admitted of public and ocular demonstration, like that of a balloon, or the sun at noon-day, to all Jerusalem at least; a thing, which every body is required to believe, requires that the proof and evidence of it should be equal to all and universal: instead of this, a small number of persons, not more than eight or nine, are introduced as proxies for the whole world, to say they saw it, and all the rest of the world are called upon to believe it.' To render these things universally visible, is not in the nature of things possible; as no kind of figure whatever could be rendered visible at once, to all the millions of beings which were scattered over the surface of an opaque and spherical body, like the earth we inhabit. Besides, in some parts of the world it must have been total night. In addition to all this, to satisfy your incredibility, he must have arisen from every place, at all times, and in every age; the absurdity and impossibility of which need only to be mentioned to be despis'd. If this idea is too gross to be admitted, let us turn our thoughts to the subject in another form.

"As all could not be admitted evidences to this transaction, what  
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part shall be dismissed? It must be all the past, all the future, and nine-tenths of the world besides; and all those who were thus excluded must necessarily depend on those who saw it for every information they obtained on the subject. Here then you must admit that very principle for which you condemn revelation. The principle being admitted, what number shall be fixed on as proxies for the whole world? If any part be excluded, which must be admitted? The relater of the event was bound by no necessity to bring more evidence of the truth of his allegation than he has brought; it therefore must follow, that those who saw it are sufficiently strong in point of reason to obtain the credit of the whole world; for, if ten men of established reputations be insufficient in number to establish a fact, no number can be free from the same objection. The same objection, which will apply to ten men, will be proportionably forcible against ten thousand. If you can demonstrate any number to be more proper to the purpose than what is recorded, you shall be thanked for the discovery. As it is impossible for any thing to be and not to be at the same time, so it is impossible for the resurrection to take place in the present age; for this plain reason, it is already past. And therefore its proof cannot be equal to all and universal. Thus are you under the necessity of renouncing that universal publicity which you contend for; and of reducing it to a number of proxies, which you affect to despise. View this subject in what light you please, it upbraids you with its own absurdity."

This extract again shews us the acuteness of natural logic, mingled with some degrees of learning, and united both to expose *the foolishness of folly* in the pretendedly reasoning stay-maker. But we proceed to a third extract.

"It is very evident that nothing could create itself, and therefore not man; for this implies action prior to being, which is a contradiction. No substance having action prior to its existence, it must follow that not any thing could create itself. All things then must be either created or eternal. That individuality is not eternal, we see from daily mortality; and, if the parts which form a whole be not eternal, neither can the whole which is formed of those parts. Man therefore is not eternal.

"There are but two subjects in which all essences (which we know of), inhere, matter and spirit; to these two subjects we must turn our thoughts for the original of things. As to chance and fate, in the nature of things, they can be but the modes and accidents of matter and spirit. To suppose chance or fate to exist antecedent to matter and spirit, is to suppose them to have independent beings; and, if they have independent beings, they must exist abstracted from action; but to abstract action from fate and chance, is to destroy their existence. If fate and chance cannot exist abstracted from action, they could not create the universe; because there was a period when the universe was not created, and consequently when fate and chance did not exist. The question now renews itself, how came this universe

verse to exist? It has already been proved that matter could not create itself, and therefore not the human race; it must be, therefore, eternal or created; that it is not eternal, is evident from the certain knowledge we thus have of an intelligent being. Motion cannot be eternal, because it depends on matter for its existence; nor could matter possibly beget motion, for then motion must be uniformly produced thereby; but we know that matter exists abstracted from motion. If we deny the existence of an intelligent being, and admit matter to be eternal, we involve ourselves in new difficulties about the origin of motion. That motion is not inseparable from matter, we have the most sensible proofs; daily observation demonstrating that matter does not exist without it. Motion must be, therefore, either a mode or accident of matter, or a superadded quality; but, in admitting it in either of these cases, we destroy its eternity. If motion be not eternal, how came it to exist? It must be begotten by matter in itself; it could not be added by matter, for this implies motion prior to motion; nor could it be begotten by itself, for this would be to suppose in motion an action prior to its own existence. If matter have received motion from some power, distinct from and independent of itself, which it necessarily must, matter itself must be dependant, consequently not eternal because dependant, and that power on which it depends must be God. As matter could not any more than motion create itself or be eternal, for reasons already assigned, it must be created, and that which created it must be God. The God who created it must be something more than a philosophical abstraction; and, if more, must possess intelligence; and the order of this intelligence must be, what we call attributes. What these attributes are, or where they extend, or how they operate, we know only in part; nevertheless we know enough to attain to some knowledge of his nature. In the human mind we discern his intelligence; in the supply of all our wants, we behold his goodness; in contemplating the structure of the universe, we discover his wisdom in arranging, and power in creating and sustaining; and in contemplating the order, harmony, and disposal of all above and all below, we behold his justice. But, what justice is, in the relation it bears to God, we cannot fully comprehend. Nor is it possible, in the nature of things, that any faculty of the human mind can grasp an attribute of the infinite God, any more than a part can comprehend or contain a *whole* of which itself is but a part. In fine, what we conceive of God, is an assemblage of all possible perfections abstracted from all possible moral evil."

Here we behold, indeed, the "*sutor ultra crepidam*;" but we so behold him to our amazement. The keen activity of his mind, the shining clearness of his ideas, and the bright decisiveness of his reasoning, are all apparent in this extract, and raise him far above his situation in life to our amazed mind. We should be sorry, however, to raise one atom of discontent at his situation in the bosom of our author. We rely



rely upon the reported religiousness of his spirit to guard our praises from producing such an effect. And, in the confidence of this, we subjoin one more extract, to exhibit Mr. Drew in his double capacity of a reasoner and a religious man.

“ Having now arrived at the farther shore of your book, and obtained firm footing, I will, from this eminence, take a retrospective view of your general reflections in the last page; where you give a summary of all contained in your book, at least all that militates against Christianity.

“ The last page presents your readers with the most prominent features of your arguments in miniature. You observe, that ‘ human language is inadequate to the accomplishment of the purpose of revelation; and therefore it [this] cannot be true.’ If this principle be admitted, no written testimony can be received; because the nature of writing is to convey intelligence which was not known before, or to preserve what otherwise would not be so permanent: and, if this testimony be rejected, because liable to suspicion, this great medium of communication must be cut off. Oral testimony must of necessity follow its fate; for, if I cannot believe a man’s written evidence, it is not possible for me to believe his word. A principle more dangerous to civil society can hardly be imagined; fraught with every species of mischief, it will permit the murderer to go unpunished, and the plunderer undetected; it exposes the harmless innocent to the savage attacks of the brutal ravisher, and opens the door to every villainy. If oral or written evidence cannot be admitted because one thousand years old, neither can it if five hundred, one hundred, one year, or one day. To admit a principle, is to make it of universal application. That principle, which is immoral in its nature and pernicious in its tendency, must necessarily be bad; but these things are so; therefore the principle must be bad. By admitting this principle, you defeat the just laws of every community, in their operations, by debarring evidence from vindicating the innocent, or criminating the guilty: these consequences being contrary to every principle of justice, the principle from whence they flow must be unjust also. If justice be inadmissible into civil society, then that which produces it must be inadmissible also: but the one is true; therefore the other. Whatever God is the creator of, he can make subservient to his purposes; but God is the creator of human speech and language, therefore he can make it subservient to his purposes. Whatever involves not an absolute contradiction, God can do: but the making language the vehicle of communication is no contradiction; therefore God can make it the vehicle of communication. The probability of an alteration, where there is no evidence to support that probability, leaves the probability of no alteration being made; therefore all you insinuate from hence, amounts to nothing.

“ You say ‘ the word of God is in the creation.’\* As a demonstration

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\* “ I should as soon expect men in general would learn the duties  
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tion of his power, I admit it; but as a system of duties which we owe to God and one another, I deny it. It teaches not the moral duty of doing to all man, what we in the like circumstances would wish to have returned; it teaches not to feed the hungry, to clothe the naked, to visit the sick, or to bear with the infirmities of our fellow-creatures: and therefore cannot be the word of God, in a moral sense. Secondly, it is not intelligible to all capacities, nor [to] any part thereof; therefore cannot be the source of moral duties. That which [thus] teaches moral duty, is the most obscure of mathematical problems; and yet moral duty is most essential to be known: that therefore cannot be the teacher of moral duty, which conceals that duty it came to inculcate; therefore creation cannot be the word of God. That science has not been always understood aright, is evident from only reverting to the systems of Ptolemy and Tycho-Brahe. If a knowledge of science be necessary to morality, then it is necessary that science be universally known; but this is not the case; therefore this could not be designed by God, as the means of communicating his will. These observations will not apply to revelation, [as] in *that* moral principle speaks universally, and through redemption its blessings are capable of spiritual communication. And such as have not the Bible, are a law unto themselves, and equally under the protection and care of that God, who is not austere, reaping where he has not sown, and gathering where he has not strewed.

“ Finally, Christianity and Deism are like two vessels fitted out for an arduous enterprize; but they differ as to the cargoes they shall take on board. Christianity says, that morality is not marketable without faith; Deism says it is, and that faith is superfluous and unnecessary. Now, admitting Deism to be right, Christianity cannot be wrong; because she has morality, as well as Deism. But, if faith should be essential to the acceptance of morality, Deism must be wrong. This is a fair statement of the case, and on principles of rationality it admits no time to determine a prudent choice. I choose, for my part, to embark on board Christianity, and sincerely wish that I may be so faithful to its principles and practices, that I may obtain, at last, my part in the resurrection of the just. And that you, Sir, though labouring to sink my ‘ vessel in the gaping deep,’ may, through that mercy of God which you reject, arrive safe at that haven of peace, where an extraction of moral evil from our natures shall annihilate a profaneness of sentiment, and lead us forth to receive a common Saviour’s love, is the unfeigned wish of one, who, till that awful period shall arrive, will be, in all probability, to you unknown.”

We have thus taken peculiar notice of this ill-printed, provincial pamphlet, in order to set its merits in a peculiar point

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of *morality*, from contemplating a hedge of thorns, a heap of stones, or a pool of water, as from the rest of the creation; for the things I have mentioned are as much the work of God as Saturn, or Cyrus, (Syrius.)”

of view; and to shew the author as he really stands before us, in a situation that precludes almost all learning, yet in an attitude not unworthy of a first rate scholar; in the form of a judicious thinker, a close reasoner, and, what is superior to both characters—a feeling Christian.

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ART. V. *The Asiatic Annual Register; or a View of the History of Hindustan, and of the Politics, Commerce, and Literature of Asia, for the Year 1799.* 8vo. Pp. 981. Price 12s. Debrett. 1800.

A WORK of this nature has long been a desideratum in the world of literature and politics. Considering the extent of the British empire in India, and its growing influence on the affairs of Europe, our knowledge of that country, and of the surrounding states, has been, hitherto, extremely partial and confined. The necessity of its enlargement will readily be admitted, not only by the man of letters and the politician, but by all who wish to trace the rise and progress of that mighty empire from its source to its present state of prosperity, to acquire a due understanding of passing events, and to obtain the ability to appreciate those momentous occurrences, which the inquisitive and speculative mind can scarcely fail to anticipate. The volume before us seems extremely well calculated to supply the basis of such knowledge, to afford competent information on the present commercial, political, and literary state of India, and to direct the inquirer, who may wish to enter on a deeper investigation of the subject, to trace effects to their original causes, or to follow causes to their remoter effects, to the pure and genuine sources of intelligence.

The editors congratulate themselves, with good reason, on their good fortune in introducing their work to the public,

“at a new epoch in the History of British India. The brilliant prospect which that invaluable country now presents, under the wise and auspicious administration of the Noble MARQUIS who presides over it, while it excites the admiration and envy of surrounding nations, cannot but afford the most solid satisfaction to every British heart. We there behold, under the mild and just government of Britain, an ancient and highly cultivated people, restored to the full enjoyment of their religious and civil rights, after having endured, for seven centuries, the most inexorable tyranny recorded in the annals of mankind: we behold the useful industry of that people exerted, not less for their own benefit than for that of their rulers; and, instead of being wasted in the support of unprincipled and destructive wars, is nourished in the bosom of commerce, to secure the peace and happiness of nations: and above all, we behold the immeasurable resources of the most fertile region in the world, at the command of the